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Many scholars today in both political science and economics disciplines agree on the broad 
arguments of the 'resource curse thesis' which suggests that reliance on large resource rents 
by the state often fails to bring about outcomes which benefit society as a whole. Thus 
natural resources constitute a kind of curse rather than of a blessed impetus for 
development. The literature presents three areas in which natural resources impact a state 
adversely; namely, economic outcomes, forms of governance and conflict proneness. With 
regards to armed civil conflict the theory suggests that the presence of abundant natural 
resources, in particular, fuels and mineral resources, increases the incidence, duration and 
intensity of armed civil conflict in a state. This thesis seeks fundamentally to explain the 
incidence and persistence of violent civil conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta region from a 
political economy of natural resource abundance perspective. From the literature, I derive a 
number of testable hypotheses to explain the onset and duration of resource related civil 
conflict. In assessing these against the case I find that the resource-conflict relationship in 
the Niger Delta is primarily mediated not simply by greed or grievance as much of the 
literature suggests but also by critical governance failures when the state is considered as 
both actor and institution. Specifically within Nigeria's nominal democracy where power is 
decentralised but accountability is low, political elite spread arms through clandestine 
patronage networks thereby wittingly and unwittingly equipping potential rebellions. The 
question of what accounts for the resource-conflict link is not just academic as specific 
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The discontented represent a real threat to the existing order, and that order is 
also deprived of vital contributions to the project of creating prosperity for the 
commonweal[th). Scarcity is the soil in which revolt is nurtured. Political 
violence deployed to maintain control over the dollars generated by oil wealth 
may work in the short term, but ultimately it defeats its own purpose . ... And that 
is why the malformed political order is dying. 
Okonta (2005: 208) 
Chapter 1 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST COLD-WAR INTRA-STATE 
CONFLICTS: AN INTRODUCTION 
The political economy of intra-state conflict as a research agenda attracted the 
considerable interest of academics from the early to mid-1990s (Malone & Nitzschke, 
2004:2). In light of important shifts in the global and economic order following the cold 
war, some commentators have begun to refer to recent intra-state conflicts as "new wars" 
or "complex humanitarian emergencies" characterised by predation and increasing 
civilian casualties (Cramer, 2002a: 1). Interestillg:y, conflict studies have in recent times, 
been influenced not only by political scientists but quite notably by economists and in 
particular neoclassical economists (Pearce, 2005: 152). Their somewhat untraditional 
intervention into the discipline was first brought on by the recognition that post-cold war 
conflicts were different to conflicts which arose in the context of that era and thus 
required new analytical approaches. Pearce (2005: 152) describes post cold war wars as 
being: 
... about identity struggles rather than ideological ones; they employ new modes 
of warfare that aim to control and homogenize populations through violence and 
forced population expulsion; they are intra- rather than inter-state, yet are 










financing through access to natural resources that generate income through 
illegal transnational trade flows rather than domestic exploitation 
During the cold war, rebel groups were typically financed by one of the superpowers or 
by proxies within the region seeking to strengthen their ideological block (Bannon & 
Collier 2003). With the end of the cold war and decline of external support, both 
governments and rebel groups have sought alternative sources of revenue to sustain their 
military campaigns; often relying on trade in legally or illegally exploited natural 
resources, smuggling of contraband and drugs, money laundering and the capture of 
diaspora remittances I to raise their own belligerent funding (Le Billion, 2001: 562; 
Ballantine & Nitzschke, 2003; Malone & Nitzschke, 2004:12). It is in part due to the 
observation of this self-financing quality of combat that a new focus on the economics of 
intrastate conflicts was prompted. 
Secondly, the increased incidence and the particularly brutal nature of contemporary civil 
wars, drew wide spread interest in the analysis of these conflicts which were occurring 
mostly in low and middle income countries (Cramer, 20()~a. 2000b: de Soysa, 2000, 
2002). Inter-governmental and non-governmental development agencies have invested a 
great deal of resources into research on armed conflict with a view to formulating policy 
solutions and in the process have drawn development economists into the debate(Pearce 
2005: 152). 
Given the central role of natural resources as a source of financing for belligerents, the 
term "resource wars" soon came to be widely circulated (Cilliers, 2000; Klare 2001; 
Renner 2002). Examples of these resource wars abound. In Africa, a civil war which 
1 Diaspora remittances have been increasingly identified as a resource fuelling the conflict in Somalia much the same way natural resources 











began as an anti-colonial struggle waged on for decades in diamond and oil rich Angola 
(Cilliers, 2000: 1); an estimated 2.5 million people died in the course of the conflict and 
its violent aftermath in the resource rich Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Renner, 
2002:1); Liberia's rebelleader-turned-president, Charles Taylor, generated income from 
the export of rubber, timber, and diamonds to finance his violent insurgence and 
subsequent incursion into Sierra Leone (Malone & Nitzschke, 2004:3). Further a-field, 
during Cambodia's civil war the rebellious Khmer Rouge on the one hand and 
government on the other were reported to have raised an astounding $220-390 million a 
year combined from selling high-grade timber on world markets (Renner, 2003:2). In 
Colombia, guerrilla forces and paramilitaries engage in the production and trafficking of 
cocaine, money laundering, kidnapping and extortion (Nitzschke& Studdard, 2005:224). 
The political economy of resource conflicts as a research and policy agenda received 
considerable attention mainly because of the massive humanitarian price of these wars 
and their resulting economies which thrive on dealings with shady conflict entrepreneurs, 
vari0\~" ;ran"l;, ... ·j(mal corporations, arms brok-.:rs, transn~tional Vi1'llinal :letwo\ 1.:;, alJd 
corrupt governments, from amongst the world's commodity markets and major financial 
centres. It is now generally accepted that understanding the political economy of conflict 
is vital to improved conflict analysis and policy responses. 
The literature on the link between natural resources and conflict identifies two 
relationships: 1) the resource scarcity thesis put forward by Neo-Malthusians and 2) the 
resource abundance or resource curse thesis argued chiefly by Neo-Classical economists. 











Homer-Dixon2 , focuses on the connection between growmg pressures on increasingly 
scarce renewable natural resources (e.g., arable land, freshwater, forests, and fisheries), 
caused in part by exponential population growth, and violent, mainly intrastate, conflict. 
Empirical and qualitative studies (Baechler et al. 1996; Baechler and Spillman 1996; 
Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Kahl 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001) have been 
used to demonstrate that population growth, environmental degradation, and natural 
resource competition have interacted on many occasions to produce or exacerbate civil 
and ethnic violence. These threats, it is argued, often outweigh traditional military threats 
to a country's security. Rogers (2002) suggests that the absence of clean air and water as 
well as deforestation could create conditions which, though not directly related to 
military security, can trigger economic decline, societal disruption, and thus conflict. 
According to neo-Malthusians, scarcity produces conflict in two primary ways. Firstly, 
resource scarcity induces elites to 'capture' resources, depriving powerless groups in the 
process. Another way in which scarcity is said to cause conflict is through its adverse 
effect on economic and social innovation. Homer-Dixon calls this the 'ingenu:~y gap' 
(1999:7). He argues that in resource poor countries scarcity acts as a constraint on socio-
economic innovation keeping them poor and indirectly contributing to the resort to armed 
conflict. 
Neo-classical economists on the other hand, identify resource abundance as a key factor 
in the onset and duration of conflicts, particularly intra-state wars. This view is embodied 
in the theory commonly known as the 'resource curse' thesis, a term originally used by 
Richard Auty in 1993. It at first referred to the paradox that countries with an abundance 











of natural resources perform worse economically than countries without such resources. 
Economists claimed that reliance on abundant natural resources creates distortions that 
shift investment away from non-resource tradeable sectors of the economy which have 
the potential to accelerate economic growth thus shrinking those industries and making 
them less competitive on the international market (Corden & Neary, 1982). This 
economic manifestation of the resource curse is known as the 'Dutch Disease'. However, 
over the years, the resource curse thesis expanded to include explanations of the nature of 
politics and risk of conflict in resource-rich contexts. Broadly, the argument goes that a 
number of developmental pathologies caused by an abundance of natural resources 
greatly increase the likelihood of violent conflict or more precisely, that natural resources 
could lead to poor economic growth, authoritarian regimes and civil conflict. Further, 
access to natural resource financing potentially lengthens these conflicts (Ross, 2004b). 
The question thus follows, which factor scarcity or abundance serves to better explain the 
link between resources and civil conflicts? Critics of the neo-Malthusian theory of 
modem and more efficient forms of production which ease the demands on them 
(Gleditsch & Theisen 2006: 4). Moreover, the decrease of commodity prices on 
international markets is evidence that resources are far from scarce. The neo-Malthusian 
response to this criticism is that while certain resources may be abundant globally, they 
are scarce locally and it is this local scarcity which triggers conflict. However, their 
critics go on to argue that trade and market mechanisms which motivates innovation and 
shifts in resources can lead societies to overcome local scarcities (Le Billon 200]: 564). 











improved environmental conservation In practice (Tiffen et al. 1994). According to 
'cornucopians', chief critics of the scarcity-war thesis, resource scarcity and population 
pressure can result in socio-economic innovation and substitution, resulting in a more 
diversified economy, which in tum yields a more equitable distribution of power across 
society. Contrary to the pathologies which neo-Malthusians contend derives from 
resource scarcity, particularly in developing countries with challenges to good 
governance, it is in the interest of the elite of resource-poor countries to develop and 
exploit human capital, rather than try to accumulate scarce or non-existent resource rents. 
In which case, the probability of violent conflict decreases as human capital develops (e.g. 
through education, trading and manufacturing skills), the economy diversifies, and 
governance becomes more representative and accountable (Le Billon 2001: 564). In 
response to Homer-Dixon's ingenuity gap, a view which suggests that countries with 
scarce renewable resource endowments fare worse in terms of development de Soysa 
(2005:7) points out that neither empirical evidence nor economic growth theories support 
this hypothesis. it i' in fact resource rich countries which perform worse economically. 
Where resource scarcity helps bring about technological innovation, economIC 
diversification, strong institutions and democratic government, de Soysa (2002:7) 
contends that abundant resources (both renewable and non-renewable), on the other hand, 
hinder incentives for innovation and thus yield unfavourable development outcomes for 
the majority. This occurs when the state becomes reliant on resource rents for income; 
leaving it with little incentive to invest in human capital or to innovate technologically. 











The build up of produced capital and skills [in a resource-rich context] is slower 
than the successful resource-deficient economy. Overall, the inherently slower 
and less egalitarian growth trajectory of the resource-rich countries is intensified 
and the end result is usually a growth collapse. The collapse causes all forms of 
capital, including institutional, social and natural, to run down. Part of the 
explanation for the superior performance of the resource- deficient countries is 
that their Spartan endowment of natural capital acts as a constraint on 
government failure by placing a premium on the need to nurture scarce resources, 
including skills, institutions and social capital, and to achieve an efficient 
allocation of capital. 
The absence of incentives to generate sound social and economic policy as a result of 
reliance on natural resource rents in fact forces dependence on these rents. Political 
scientists and economists alike agree that reliance on large resource rents fails to bring 
about equitable state-society bargains characterised by outcomes which benefit society as 
a whole (de Soysa, 2002:7) thereby constituting a kind of curse as instead of a blessing 
(Auty 2001; Ross 1999; Sachs & Warner 2001). With resource rents firmly in their 
control, political elites have little inducement for social investment. Moore (2000:20-22) 
makes this case for states dependent on oil and mineral rents 3 • According to him, the 
adverse effects of a state not needing to tax its citizens include autonomy of the state 
ti·'m its citizen., and an ~1b3enct:: of ~rlv_l1tive~ fer,;. ;\. p0litics; vulner:1bility to ' .. ,1J::,1 
attempts at state capture; a weak and opaque public service not geared towards revenue 
collection or service delivery; the vulnerability of an untaxed, unrecorded citizenry to 
subversive movements; and proneness to collapse in the event that resource rents dry up. 
Ballantine and N itzschke (2003:4) appear to concur with this prognosis in their 
observations of Sierra Leone and the DRC, where they note the eruption of armed 
conflict was preceded by decades of plunder by self-serving state elite who intensified 
3 He aJso argues that dependence on foreign aid appears to have similar etkets on the recipients politics as does reliance on resource rents by 
removing much public expenditure Irom the budget and thus from legislative. or public sClUtiny: and by reducing the actual scope for 











socio-economic deterioration and institutional disintegration In both countries, which 
ultimately led to violent state collapse. 
Vast and theoretically compelling literature on the resource curse presents a formidable 
challenge to the resource scarcity-civil violence argument. This paper seeks 
fundamentally to explain the incidence or onset and persistence of armed civil conflict in 
Nigeria's Niger Delta region from a political economy of natural resource abundance 
perspective. 
Research on the resource curse also contains several studies showing that natural resource 
wealth is associated with the onset of civil conflict and influences its duration and 
intensity ~ that is, the number of combat-related deaths (Rosser, 2006:9). Thus in addition 
to and at times as a result of the undesirable effects natural resource wealth has on a 
country's economics performance and political outcomes, violent civil conflict also 
becomes more likely. Scholars have examined the causal mechanisms linking natural 
resource abundance and four dimensicfs of civil conflict: the onset, duration, intensity 
and type of conflict i.e. separatist or non-separatist. Political Economy analyses have 
recently proposed that presence of mineral resource wealth increases the incidence, 
duration and intensity of civil wars (Auty, 2005; Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Collier 
2000a; Collier & Hoeffler 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Ross 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Karl 
1997). Much of the literature has focussed on civil war defining it as a conflict which a) 
occurs within the recognised boundaries of a single state; b) involves combat between the 
State and at least one recognised rebel force; and c) causes at least one thousand combat-











such a narrow delineation excludes the smaller-scale but significant stages of a conflict 
which may take place over a long period and exacerbate undesirable economic or 
political conditions that could in tum prolong strife and eventually lead to full-scale war. 
Instead of the more narrow term, civil war, I employ more generic terminology, 'civil 
conflict' the definition of which has been adopted from Kahl's 'civil strife' (2006:30): 
.. .large-scale, sustained, and organized violent conflict within a country. This 
includes revolution, rebellion, insurgency ... war, and sustained campaigns of 
terrorism [against the State]. It does not include smaller-scale or less-organized 
forms of internal violence, such as riots ... , or international conflicts 
While scholars may agree that natural resource wealth leads to civil conflict, there is less 
agreement on precisely how the two are linked. At first, much of the earlier debate on the 
exact causal mechanism linking resources to conflict was focused on the 'grievance vs. 
greed' dichotomy, first introduced by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998), researchers 
attached to the World Bank. This debate is best understood within the context of the 
wider discussion over the causes of civil war which has centred on two main arguments. 
The first reflects behaviouralist ideas and underscores the motives of rebel organisations. 
This vi':I': 5l:3g~stG that civil wars dTt causcc! b, grh '"tn(e~ ··Yer ineq.,,;;,\C' (,f wealth, 
limited political rights, environmental degradation, expropriation of land rights, forced 
migration, inadequate employment opportunities and unmet expectations regarding 
benefits of natural resources (Rosser, 2006: 17). As the economic gap between the ruling 
class and the proverbial 'common man' widens and political access remains exclusive, 
frustration amongst marginalised groups deepens. Increasingly, political change is seen as 
the only avenue of satisfying the aspirations or expressing the grievances of the ruled. In 
the absence of a common political consensus -which cannot be sustained by largess and 











progress and political representation (Le Billon, 2001 :567). Behaviouralist views which 
cite grievances as the driving force behind conflict have been proposed chiefly by 
political scientists such as Carter (2003), Regan (2003) and Stewart (2002). The second 
argument reflects ideas associated with the rational actor perspective, and highlights the 
economic incentives and opportunities facing rebel organisations. In contrast to the 
justice-seeking -behaviouralist- argument, it assumes that rebellions are caused by greed 
that is, rebel leaders and their followers are loot-seeking individuals who believe they can 
'do well out of war' and simply use the discourses of grievance to justify their behaviour 
(Collier, 2000a). Following from this argument -often referred to as the 'looting 
mechanism' - is the proposition that civil conflict is most likely when opportunities exist 
for rebels to fund their activities by extracting and selling resources or extorting money 
from those who do (Ross 2004b:40). 
A number of scholars have argued that neither the grievance nor looting mechanisms 
alone are particularly helpful in understanding the onset of civil conflict in actual cases. 
degrees, by some combination of looting and grievance, instead of just one or the other 
(Ballantine, 2003: 260). Moreover, Ross (2004b), finds support for alternative greed-
based mechanisms including the 'foreign intervention' mechanism (where resource 
abundance increases the probability of conflict by increasing the chances of foreign 
intervention to support a rebel movement) and the 'booty futures' mechanism (where 
resource wealth increases the chances of civil conflict by enabling rebel organisations to 
sell future extraction rights to the resources they expect to capture in order to raise funds 











excluded from the final analysis primarily because it lies outside the scope of the study. 
Other scholars argue that resources affect conflict via state weakness or failures (Auty 
2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2003; Pearce 2005; Reno 2000, 2002; Silberfein 
2004; Snyder 2002). 
A state-centric approach to explaining civil conflict maintains that high dependence on 
natural resources affects the state's capacity in ways that heighten the risk of internal 
political violence. Political approaches to this state-centric view perceive conflict to be 
the result of an erosion of legitimacy and effective governance caused by the inability of 
a state to monopolise force, maintain order within state boundaries, and provide public 
goods. According to those focusing on the economic factors in state failure, the 
systematic diversion of resource rents through corrupt patronage networks essentially 
creates the opportunity for anned conflict as control over these channels of wealth 
accumulation and distribution becomes contested (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2003:4). It is 
easy to see how these two approaches can be linked. In accumulating and controlling the 
the support of the urban, more enlightened populace than on rural people who appear to 
pose a lesser threat to the status quo leaving substantial territories within the state with 
little or no government presence vulnerable to rebel recruitment and control (Ross, 
2003: 11). Leaders of rebel organisations often tend to be disgruntled fonner government 
officials or associates of ruling elite previously benefiting from patronage. In this way 
ruling elites may themselves create the environments and provide the means for their 











The question of whether state capacity, greed or grievance accounts for the resource-
conflict link is not just academic. Implications from each entail quite different policy 
paths (de Soysa & Neumayer, 2003:1). Although highly influential among policy-makers, 
in the World Bank and other donor agencies, qualitative and quantitative studies have 
challenged the rebel-centric 'greed thesis' and its methodological foundations. 
Increasingly, research confirms that the resource-conflict relationship is primarily 
mediated by critical governance failures by the state - both as an actor and institution -
(Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005:223). These failures include systemic corruption, economic 
mismanagement, patrimonial rule, privatisation of security etc that weaken states and 
make them more vulnerable to rebellion; that is, the state-centric view of conflict onset 
(Ballantine & Nitzschke, 2003: 17). Nevertheless, a more comprehensive understanding 
of how economic and social dimensions can influence the onset, character and duration of 
armed conflicts is important to formulating the most holistic and effective policy 
interventions possible. 
opportunity for policy interventions against further intensification of the conflict. Violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta arose afresh in the early 1990s due to tensions between the 
Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) and a number of Niger Delta minority ethnic 
groups who claimed they were being exploited. Social, political, inter and intra ethnic 
unrest persisted throughout the 1990s and appears to be escalating as of 2007 despite the 











Since Nigeria achieved independence from British rule in 1960, successive military and 
democratic governments have failed to deliver the most basic economic and 
developmental conditions to the peoples of the Niger Delta. The country is currently the 
tenth largest supplier of petroleum globally, and provides the USA with approximately 
one fifth of its oil. Despite the several hundred billion dollars worth of oil that has been 
derived from the region since 1956 when it was first discovered, the people of the Niger 
Delta remain desperately poor subsisting on less than a dollar a day. 
A UNDP Report (2006) describes the Niger Delta, which accounts for upwards of 80 per 
cent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, about 70 per cent of government revenues 
and nearly 40 per cent of total GDP, as a region of paradoxes. The report points to the 
irony of a region so nationally and internationally strategic and yet suffering from 
administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, 
social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict. There is nearly 
a complete lack of roads in a region whose wealth is funding gigantic infrastructural 
development situation as "appalling" and maintained that the region is unlikely to meet 
any of the Millennium Development Goal targets, except for school enrolment, by 2015 
"or anytime soon after." Infant mortality in rural areas of the South-South geopolitical 
zone of Nigeria in which the Delta is located remains higher than in any other part of 
Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The Niger Delta has also borne the massive 
environmental impacts of a poorly regulated oil industry. Every year hundreds of oil 
spills due to accidental damage, corrosion of aged pipes and sabotage spoil farmland and 











spite of repeated promises to phase it out. Flaring has produced one of the best-known 
symbols of the region's problems, 'perpetual daylight', as the conflagrations light up the 
night sky for miles around them (ibid). 
Now Nigeria's oil belt is embroiled in violent resistance against the State and the 
MNOCs in which youth are at the forefront. The official response of state repression and 
corporate violence has further engendered widespread violence, criminality, lawlessness 
and insecurity. Today the Niger Delta is characterised by intense hostilities, violent 
confrontations and criminal violence. It is pervaded by a proliferation of arms and 
organisations and government agencies employing violence from the Nigerian Armed 
Forces and corporate security outfits on the one hand to community, ethnic and youth 
militias, armed gangs and networks, pirates, cultists and armed robbers on the other hand. 
An economy of conflict characterised by an intensely violent struggle for the capture of 
oil resources and its benefits, a thriving market of illegal trading of arms, crude and 
refined oil and m~··~·· recently extortion through kidnapping of foreign oil ~.'Orkers, now 
exists. The NigerIan Economic Summit Group (NESG) estimates a daily theft of roughly 
100,000 barrels of crude valued at about USD 2.8 million (Nigerian Tribune, 15 
September 2003). Kidnapping for extortion has accelerated at an alarming rate since the 
first high profile case in September 2005 by the notorious militant group, Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Various newspaper and security reports 
suggest that the practice has grown into a multi-million dollar business·. 
4 See: 'Daily Champion (Lagos). 7 June 2007. Nigeria: Hostages - Militants Demand" 150 "lillian Ransom. by Tony Ita Dim and Chilledu 











While it is quite clear even to the casual observer that profit driven self-interest is a 
significant factor in this crisis, a more careful inspection is required to determine when 
and how this trend affects the conflict. It is also evident that not all aspects of rebel 
behaviour, such as sabotage, has been directly motivated by personal gain; highlighting 
the existence of grievances as another contributing factor. The literature poses compelling 
arguments for greed, grievance and state failure respectively as the mediating factors 
between resource abundance and conflict. This thesis specifies and tests each of these 
theories against the case to ascertain if, when and how each of these factors manifests 
itself in the Niger Delta crisis. Identifying the nature of these relationships in this case is 
vital to assessing the aptness of policy interventions. A further objective of this study is to 
critically examine the policy response of government and evaluate its suitability. In 
attempting to isolate the potential disconnect between the actual problem and the 
solutions presently being applied, more effective policies may be formulated. Merely 
observing that the violence appears to be on the rise suggests that the present military 
approach is inadequate. Thef-T' ger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) establishc-r1 
in 2000 by the immediate past president of Nigeria to redress the developmental failures 
of previous governments has had very limited success. I argue that the same remedy of 
accountability and transparency needed to kick start the Commission, are critical to 
ending conflict in the entire region. 
Though I can make no generalisations from a single case study, this approach does help 
us to draw inferences about the salience of the intervening variables which link natural 
Daily Independent (online edition). II July 2007, :\iger Delta: The Shame ofa 'Kid-napping', by 'vlike Ikhariale 
(http::,,, \\ w,independentngonline,com:')c~92&a~30296): Stakeholder Democracy :\etwork, September 5th 2006. Niger Delta Analysis: 











resource wealth to civil conflict. For instance where certain scholars seem to have 
succumbed to the reductionism of greed versus grIevance, case studies provide the 
opportunity to prove or disprove the validity of these theoretical ambitions. According to 
Ross (2002:6; 2004) some desirable properties of case studies, aside from attention to 
causal linkages, include accounting for variables not easily quantified, and sensitivity to 
case-specific factors creating a more accurate tool for policy interventions. Other scholars 
of the resource curse such as Pearce (2005) recommend a qualitative case study approach 
as well. 
This particular case lends itself to such a study for a number of reasons. First, there is an 
ongoing debateS about which natural resources precisely evoke the resource curse but by 
most accounts oil matters (de Soysa 2000, 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Isham et al. 2002; 
Leite & Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2003). According to empirical 
studies testing the resource curse thesis, dependence on resources wealth-measured as the 
per centage of resource exports to GDP-rather than simply the existence of resource 
conflict (Nitzschke & Studdard 2005:223). Dependence on oil revenues is a main feature 
in Nigeria's economy. 
Third, the country has gained strategic significance globally due to the political and social 
instability that threaten Middle East oil supplies. Further Nigerian oil is classified 'light 
sweet crude', because it requires very little refining, this makes it a particularly valuable 
on the international markets. In 2002 the US State Department declared that Nigeria and 
5 See Rosser (2006), 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey', Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper 











all other African oil imports were considered a "strategic national interest". Two years 
later a set of events referred to by analysts as 'the Nigerian Oil Crisis' help drive up 
petroleum prices worldwide6 • That crude production has decreased by 547,000 barrels per 
day or 18 per cene of Nigeria's normal operating capacity goes beyond a national issue; 
more so since the onset of the Iraqi war. 
This thesis focuses on events in the Niger Delta following the start, in 1999, of Nigeria's 
most recent effort at democratisation. This period has seen a distinct change in the nature 
of civil conflict in the region; counter intuitively the conflict seems to be deepening as 
opposed to responding to the expected increase in openness and rule of law under 
democracy. The situation in the Niger Delta raises serious questions about the character 
of Nigeria's democracy. Is democracy simply the devolution of power, resources and 
access to a wider political class or must accountability and transparency be tied in with 
these changes for a system to be truly democratic? 
Data for this study is derived from secondary SOll'C~~ These incluct!" hooks and journal 
articles, country reports by independent observl!rs 'and aid agencies, government policy 
papers and sections of the Nigerian Constitution as well as newspaper reports and internet 
based sources. My method of data gathering is therefore largely by critical content 
analysis, 
6 See :\ns\\crs.com. "igerian Oil Crisis' (http:/,w\vw.answcrs.colllltopic/nigerian~oil-ciisis) 
7 Reuters (online). \7 Jul 2007. 'Shell pipeline on fire in Nigeria after protests', by Estelle Shilbon (http:' \\ \\ \\ .dlertnet.org thenewSlflewsdesk/L17313688.htm) 
8 Whlle some repoTts (Hamilton et al. 2004) claim that between 1999 and 2004. conflict related deaths IJl the 'iger Delta reached the 1000 a year mark these 











Finally, as per the above definition of civil war generating one thousand battle related 
deaths a year, the Niger Delta conflict is still relatively low intensity8. Studies such as the 
present one could serve the important purposes of uncovering methods to diffuse the 
conflict and avert it escalating into a full on civil war. 
The analysis proceeds as thus. Chapter two begins with an overview of the resource curse 
thesis and its foundations. Following this, I draw out a set of general, falsifiable 
hypotheses of conflict mechanisms from the literature; stating the observable implications 
of each hypothesis, that is, what we would expect to observe in the case if a hypothesis 
holds true. These observable implications are neither too general nor specific in order to 
reduce false deductions. In chapter three I describe the case in some detail. Testing the 
case against the hypotheses previously derived, the thesis establishes the presence or 
absence of the observable implications of each conflict mechanism; analysing the results 
to determine the factors responsible for the onset and persistence of civil conflict in the 
Niger Delta. Juxtaposing this analysis with the Nigerian government's response, I 
identifying the catalysts and facilitators of civil conflict in the Niger Delta I hope to draw 
attention to the ways in which official policy interventions crucially miss the point. This 
study focuses principally on government's reaction or contribution to the crisis. Although 
the role of MNOCs is considered this is mainly when they act in alliance with the 
Nigerian government ~. Finally, I conclude by summarising my arguments and 
recommending a more constructive direction for policy interventions than is presently 
9 For a discussion on the role of MNOCs in the Niger Delta and their relationship to their host communities see: Zalik. A. (2004) The Niger 
Delta: Petro Violence and Partnership Development. Review of AIi-ican Political Economy_ 10 1.4: 401-424; Frynas. G. (1998) Political 











heard within the Nigerian government's discourse on the Issue as well as indicating 
important areas for future research. 
My aim in this thesis is not to test the validity of resource-conflict hypotheses but simply 
to specify them and explore their plausibility in this case. In my conclusion, however, I 
raise some of the criticisms of the resource curse thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, my 
arguments are based on the premise that the resource dependence-civil conflict 
correlation has already been established by previous empirical work. What I attempt to do 
here is describe the causal mechanisms which link the variables and to show if and when 
they occur in the Niger Delta. Although it represents an area of research that may soon 
gain greater significance, I do not include external or foreign intervention in the scope of 
this study. At present and from my perspective, the only foreign players of note in the 













THE RESOURCE CURSE AND CONFLICT MECHANISMS 
Until a few decades ago, abundant natural resources were generally accepted as a plus for 
development. During the 1960s, economists and development theorists alike argued that a 
wealth of natural resources would help developing countries make the leap from 
underdevelopment to industrialisation (Rosser, 2006:7). The logic remained essentially 
the same through the 70s and much of the 80s when economists maintained that funds 
realised from the sale of natural resources could be invested in building domestic markets 
(Rosser 2006). By and large natural resources were seen as a blessing. 
Then in the late 1980s, a growing number of scholars began to challenge this position. 
The emerging body of literature asserted that rather than being a blessing, plentiful 
natural resources (especially particular types of natural resources), could in fact have a 
negative economic, political and social outcomes. Broadly the ar;':;l'ment goes that a 
number of developmental pathologies caused by an abundance ,~: natural resources 
greatly increase the likelihood of violent conflict or more precisely, that natural resources 
could lead to poor economic growth, authoritarian regimes and civil conflict. Poor 
economic performance of some oil exporters as well as the proliferation of civil conflicts 
amongst mineral rich countries has lent credence to this thesis and the idea that natural 
resources are bad for development is now commonly accepted (Lane & Tornell, 1995; 
Sachs & Warner, 1995; Karl, 1997; Auty, 1998; Collier & Hoeftler, 1998; Ross, 1999; 











The literature on the resource curse consists of three strands. One group of scholars have 
focused on the relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
performance. The second sub-group examines the relationship between natural resource 
abundance and political regimes; and finally a third group links natural resource 
abundance to the onset, intensity and duration of violent civil conflict. The economic 
foundations of the resource curse rest largely on a number of aberrant mechanisms jointly 
known as "Dutch Disease". Fundamentally these distortions shift investment away from 
non-resource tradeable sectors of the economy that have the potential to accelerate 
economic growth, thus making them less competitive (Corden & Neary, 1982). 
Discussions of the political effects of resource wealth have been framed by the rentier 
state model (DiJohn, 2002:2). The core of which states that rentier state rulers in 
depending on resource rents instead of taxes, function in isolation from their citizens and 
are more likely to engage in predatory behaviour and adopt authoritarian forms of rule. 
These two manifestations of the "curse" lead to considerable societal grievances which in 
tum supposedly ignite violent conflicts (Ross, 2003a) Some scholars also suggf"'>t that 
the mere presence of valuable resources provides sufficient impetus to fight as political 
entrepreneurs cooperate to capture resources for their personal enrichment (Collier, 2000; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Finally, there is the school-of-thought that state failure is 
largely responsible for creating the opportunity for viable challenges to its authority and 
monopoly on the use of force (Pearce, 2005; Silberfein, 2004; Reno, 2000). 
This chapter outlines the resource curse hypothesis by describing its economIC and 











proposed by the third sub-group of scholars to determine whether measurable conflict 
mechanisms can be derived to test the case. 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
Quite a number of studies have been carried out linking natural resource wealth with poor 
economic growth and particularly the abundance of specific types of natural resources. 
As earlier as the 1980s researchers found that countries abounding in mineral resources 
grew more slowly than those that did not within sub-Saharan Africa (Wheeler, 1984). 
Mineral exporting countries, particularly those exporting oil, experienced negative 
economic growth during the boom years of 1971 to 1983 (Auty, 1993). In their seminal 
study, Sachs and Warner (1995), using sizable data sets, found that natural resource 
wealth was negatively correlated with economic growth. Other scholars have gone on to 
show that per capita incomes of resource-poor countries tended to be significantly higher 
than those ofresource-rich countries between 1960 and 1990 (Rosser, 2006: 13). 
Bno;,d pOl)r growth, funtc1 :';[HJies have presef1ted evidence ,vl11ch indicate that ~-;the~' 
economic problems experienced by resource abundant countries include poor agricultural 
growth, increased resource dependence, inflation, low levels of saving, high 
unemployment, high external indebtedness and susceptibility to resources price shocks 
from international markets (Rosser, 2006: 14). Because of their under diversified 
economy, resource-rich countries are less likely to export manufactured goods than 
resource-poor countries (Wood & Berge, 1997). Resource abundance is also associated 











All of these studies offer vanous theories and hypotheses to explain the empirical 
evidence. This section of the chapter presents the most influential of these hypotheses. 
One of the most prominent explanations for the negative relationship between natural 
resource wealth and economic growth is the Dutch Disease model. This model was first 
developed by Corden and Neary (1982). The model assumes that there are three sectors in 
the economy namely the non-tradeable sectors, the booming tradeable sector and the 
lagging or non-booming tradeable sectorl. Tradeable goods are said to have export or 
import potential. The prospect of their being traded abroad sets them in constant price 
competition with substitutes from overseas. The booming tradeable sector refer to natural 
resources particularly mineral resources while lagging tradables refer largely to 
manufactured goods. Conversely, the non-tradeable sector either because of their nature 
or due to high transportation costs per product unit, high tariffs or other restrictions 
cannot easily be traded abroad. Examples of non-tradeable goods are housing, electricity 
generation, transport, various services etc2 • 
According to Corden and Neary(1982), a natural resource boom draws capital and labour 
away from the manufacturing sector causing production to shift away from 
manufacturing. This process is known as direct-deindustrialisation. However, the move, 
especially of labour, may not be all that significant in the case of highly technologically 
driven resource extraction such as with oil and natural gas. Deindustrialisation can also 
I The tenns "booming tradeable sector" and "lagging tradeable sector" are reminiscent of the natural 
resource boom of the 1970s and were sourced from wikipedia at 
bJtQ~~Lell. \\j kipedia.or~'wikiDuteh disease. Warner and Sachs (1997) who also develop a Dutch Disease 
model simply use the tenns "tradeable natural resource sector" and "tradeable non-resource sector" 
respectively 











occur indirectly when windfalls from natural resource exports increase the demand for 
non-tradeable goods and services thus moving capital and labour from manufacturing to 
the non-tradeable sector. In summary, when natural resources are abundant, tradeable 
production shifts from manufacturing to resource extraction and capital and labour move 
to the non-tradeable sector to meet demand. Moreover, resource booms could result in an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate making non-resource tradables less competitive on 
the international market, further retarding growth within the sector. 
The shrinking of the manufacturing sector or deindustrialisation is detrimental to 
economic growth mainly because manufacturing is characterised by positive externalities 
on innovation and education (Sachs &Warner, 1997). 
Another negative effect of resource wealth on the economy is its tendency to encourage 
overspending on white elephant projects. Firstly, governments of resource-rich countries 
tend to increase public spending during boom periods, then are forced to borrow to keep 
up "pending during bust pericds for political ~xrediencv. The combination of inefficient 
investment and excessive indebtedness reduce economic performance over time (Wibbels 
& Goldberg, 2007). 
The result of resource abundance is an undiversified economy dependent on a sometimes 
volatile sector (Wibbels & Goldberg, 2007). In the case of mineral resources particularly 
hydrocarbons, the sector is highly capital intensive, employs few people, relies on 
imported inputs and massive chunks of the income generated is either repatriated by 
multinational organisations or expropriated by corrupt government officials. Of course 











human development for most people living in resource rich countries. These conditions 
exacerbated by unfulfilled expectations from the natural resource boom could generate 
grievances which may in tum build up to violence. 
In the final analysis, however, most economist agree that many of the problems 
associated with deindustrialisation or the Dutch Disease could easily be resolved using 
various policy tools (Rosser, 2006: 14) thus allowing abundant natural resources to be a 
catalyst rather than an impediment to economic growth. HistoricaP and contemporary4 
examples of resources rich countries that have been developmentally successful abound; 
indicating that poor growth and all the other negative economic outcomes are not 
inevitable. The evidence these cases present has led many researchers to conclude that 
there are various political factors which meditate between resource wealth and negative 
economic outcomes; these political factors influence policy choices. 
Nevertheless, poor economic performance if it translates into poverty and low standards 
of living, as is the case in many resourcf rich developing countries, could lead to violent 
uprisings as the masses seek to express their grievances. Such conditions also make it 
easier for entrepreneurs of violence to recruit members into their rebel organisations 
(Ross 2003). 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Another sub-group of the resource curse literature focuses on the possible political factors 
referred to above. The political arguments for the resource curse arose to fill in the gaps 
1 E.g. USA 











which economics alone could not explain. These studies began to address the kind of 
regimes or governing systems that are likely to occur in resource-rich countries as well as 
the policy choices that may emerge. A number of them have shown that natural resource 
abundance is linked to low levels of democracy, slow or failed transitions to democracy 
(Wantchekon, 1999) and authoritarian rule (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). In particular, 
Ross (2001a) after observing the trends in 113 states between 1971 and 1997, found that: 
'a state's reliance on oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that 
this effect is not caused by other types of primary exports; that it is not limited to 
the Arabian peninsula, to the Middle East, or to sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is 
not limited to small states '. 
Scholars in essence began to suggest that the mam problem with natural resource 
abundance is not that it leads to economic dependence on natural resources, 
deindustrialisation and unfavourable terms-of-trade but that it creates rents and incentives 
to amass those rents. Rents can be defined as the income derived from natures as opposed 
to income derived from innovative production. Rosser (2006) also defines rents as 
"excess earnings above normal profits". The existence of resource rents greatly increases 
the prize of state ci)ntl'~)l Lhereby pr(ltnoti;-;,: ~;.:, __ .lfUJ >~havjuur knuw II "'oJ J' , , :,:ceking . 
that is, the attempt to gain access to or control over rents (Coolridge & Rose-Ackerman 
1996)- by political elites and/or social actors. 
According to Ross (2003a) natural resource abundance and thus rents could affect 












Corruption is the use of public power, position or resources for private gam. While 
private individuals and low level public officials engage in corrupt practices to bypass 
bureaucracy, controls and taxes, most scholars of the rentier model agree that members of 
the political elite or ruling class are the major culprits in this respect (Coolridge & Rose-
Ackerman 1996). Ross (2001 b), for instance, argues that when governments obtain 
windfalls from a resource boom, political elites acting rationally, will seize the 
opportunity to either directly divert the rents created by the booms or gain control over 
the right to allocate them - a process he calls 'rent-seizing' (Ross 2001b). 
There are two threats which drive corruption amongst the ruling class. The first is 
insecurity of income and the second is insecurity of political position. Volatility of 
resource pnces internationally, means that future incomes are not guaranteed. Case 
studies have shown that fluctuating resources prices expose resource dependent countries 
to economic shocks, which interfere with regular budgeting F~cedures, breed corruption 
and leave state agencies vulnerable to political influence (Ross, 2003a:8). During such 
uncertain times political elite focus on seizing the highest amount of rents possible in the 
short-term (Rosser, 2006) making all other objectives including developmental ones 
subject to rent-maximisation. The state's behaviour, in such cases, is described in the 
literature as predatory. 
However, in a situation where resource booms are perceived to be persistent i.e. resource 
prices are not in jeopardy of falling, the prize of remaining in power increases. Under 











objectives, political elite in countries with poor institutions are likely to use resources 
rents to influence elections and buy support for their regime via patronage networks 
(Robinson et aI, 2002). 
State Weakness 
Natural resource revenues can potentially, weaken governments - making them less 
likely to resolve social conflicts and meet other developmental objectives. 
This can happen in at least two ways. The first leaves state bureaucracies less effective. 
One of the biggest problems with natural resources, highlighted by the rentier model is 
their ability to provide governments with 'unearned' income i.e. funds derived from oil or 
mineral revenues instead of taxes from productive industries. In resource-poor countries 
government is strengthened through the process of extracting taxes from the population 
and putting them to efficient and effective use. The capacity of a state could be measured 
in these terms. In the case of a resource dependent country, the state often fails to regulate 
the econumy, promote private investment, production or c;conOlr,ic fTt"owth; relegating 
itself to merely being a distributive agent (Rosser, 2006: 15). As Luciani (1987), quoted 
from Rosser (2006: 16) says, rentier states do "not need to formulate anything deserving 
the appellation of economic policy. All [they need} is an expenditure policy". Karl (1999), 
who refers to such oil producing states as 'petro-states', observes that resource dependent 
states in the absence of constraining institutions not only foster distributional disputes 
amongst political elite but also tend to become more centralised, less democratic and less 











A second route by which natural resources weaken the state is by compromising its 
territorial control (Ross, 2003a). Resource booms have the propensity to reduce 
bureaucratic capacity by engendering reliance on unearned income. Weak bureaucracies 
are prone to losing touch with the grassroots and more so rural areas (OiJohn, 2002:4). 
Natural resources, particularly mineral resources tend to be concentrated in specific 
regions. Often and especially in developing countries, these regions are typically rural 
and remote where government's presence as felt in an extractive capacity or not at all. 
Land claims in these resource rich regions -more so when barriers to accessing and 
profiting from resources are low, i.e. when resources are 'lootable' - become highly 
valuable (Ross, 2003a; Kahl, 2006). Unfortunately in the absence of government 
authority to enforce or protect property rights or where such government is not even 
perceived as legitimate, disputes are largely settled by extralegal often violent means. The 
use of violence necessitates the formation of organisations such as criminal gangs and 
militia units (Ross, 2003a). Shared grievances tend to ease local recruitment into these 
organisations. Tn the end, 'rebel' groups on many ()rcasions are funded by greedy 
members of the political elite and entrepreneurs of violence exploiting rent-seeking 
opportunities. 
Poor Accountability 
Governments in resource abundant countries are able to rely on resources rents for 
revenue and thus have little need to develop their taxing capacity and thus a reciprocal 
relationship with its citizens (OiJohn, 2002). In the absence of taxes, the citizenry only 











development of democratic institutions can be delayed. Further, government officials are 
able to isolate themselves from proper scrutiny and gamer support for their rule by using 
largess and patronage to thwart the formation and campaigns of independent social 
groups calling for change. 
According to some researchers, a lack of social capital caused by the presence of natural 
resources also results in poor accountability. Scholars posit that in the presence of 
resources rents, the ruling class can afford not to develop other sectors of the economy as 
alternative means of raising revenue. In the process political elite are able to ward off the 
formation of other sources of social and economic power such as labour, the middle class 
and industrialists, who might challenge their position and policies. The absence of such 
forces of course reduces the demand for increased spending on education, trade unionism, 
democracy and social justice (Wibbels & Goldberg, 2007). 
A third hypothesis about poor accountability is that governments in resource abundant 
countrie.-; ~ave more money to spend on the military which is used to effectively quell 
dissent and repress opposition. Democratic transitions in such countries are often 
compromised as the incumbent after buying as many votes as they can, often uses state 
security agencies to influence the remaining election outcomes. We see that reduced 
accountability leaves governments the opportunity to behave in predatory ways. 
LINKING NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT 
The preceding sections have described the economic and political consequences of the 











could translate to civil violence. The occurrence of violent confrontation between civil 
groups and state forces requires certain sufficient and necessary conditions which I 
describe here as motive and opportunity respectively. 
Motive refers to justifications or reasons each actor may possess or declare for engaging 
in violent conflict. From a rational actor perspective, we can assume that prevailing 
conditions convince those who opt for violence that it is the less costly option or at least 
will yield greater returns than the status quo. The economic and political motivations for 
civil violence have been detailed above. Here I summarise the most salient of these points. 
First, economic activity in resource abundant countries tends to be dominated by the 
export of natural resources. Thus nearly all sources of income and employment presently 
and for the foreseeable future are resource related making access to resources or resource 
control a matter of survival and severe competition (Gagne, 2005: I). In an ailing 
economy where alternatives sources of livelihood are few, hostilities easily build up 
bet\ve~n compet~nl <;ocial groups who mav perceive the returns to be g:re?_~pr than the 
costs of conilict. State bureaucracies are weakened by resource dependence and predatory 
rulers who offer poor and often biased mediation over disputes and sometimes precipitate 
their degeneration into violence. 
Secondly, resource dependent economies are prone to shocks or busts caused by a crash 
in resource prices determined internationally. These shocks are likely to be followed by a 
sharp drop in public spending, massive job losses and degrading infrastructure 
exacerbated by insecure elite engaging in more aggressive rent seeking. Under these 











Grievances generated by the actual and perceived loss of status may trigger a revolt 
amongst the populace against government and its ruling class. 
Even in times of plenty, that is during resource booms, corrupt practices by plundering 
political elite may create a backlash of potentially violent protests by segments of the 
population. As discussed previously, political regimes in resource rich countries are often 
authoritarian. So where protests may otherwise have passed peacefully, repreSSIve 
governments tend to respond with undue force to quash opposition. State sponsored 
coercion tends to enforce feelings of government illegitimacy and engender violence as 
the only means of political expression and economic survival (Gagne, 2005). More so 
when such opposition comes from a distinct social group such as members of a particular 
ethnic group or communities from which natural resources are derived. These 
communities may share a sense of deprivation caused by environmental degradation, 
expropriation of land rights, forced migration, inadequate employment opportunities etc 
(Rosser, 2006: 17). Further, beliefs that the control and benefit of natural resources 
;:~~Ira;.:ted from their land ~\re mherent rights ma) :~ .. ..; Lo agitation fOfx·'ncmic a;.'(~ 
political autonomy. 
Finally, some scholars (Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; de Soysa, 2000; Ross 
2004b) have argued that greed and not grievance may constitute motivation for the use of 
violence to secure resource rents. This group suggests that various alliances may be 
formed with the criminal intent of accessing resource rents for self enrichment 
independent of the state. They may do this by directly extracting resources or by extorting 











However, upon reviewing civil wars in a large number of developing countries, including 
resource rich countries, Ballantine (2003:260), surmises that: 
'Economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the 
primmy cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to vmying degrees, they interacted 
with socioeconomic and political grievances, inter-ethnic disputes, and security 
dilemmas in triggering the outbreak of warfare '. 
In other words, she suggests that civil violence in resource abundant countries are 
motivated, to varying degrees, by a combination of greed and grievance and not simply 
one of the two. On the other hand, Weinstein (2005) argues that in the event of connict 
over abundant natural resources, opportunistic or greedy rebels crowd out ideological or 
grievance motivated rebels. The conditions under which grievances over the 
mismanagement and appropriation of resource rents by looting elite are most potent, also 
present the perfect cover for opportunistic political entrepreneurs to acquire rents illegally. 
Collier and Hoefner (2005:626) summarise Weinstein's finding succinctly in concluding 
that: 
Weinstein's killer result is that "grievance rebellion" becomes infeasible when 
"opportunistic rebellion" is few: 'lyle. Hence. in !,recise/v the conditions under 
w.liich we might mo\'t expect ":.:.:-ievL.;nc(' r",:,e/iiun "-[,i,.;'·',,{crd might eve/! heJT'P 
for it-it is least able to occur. Grievance rebellions are not suppressed by 
effective government; they are crowded out by other types of rebellion that 
contaminate the recruitment process, A rebellion started by idealists in the 
context of valuable natural resources becomes swamped by opportunists as it 
expands. 
I define 'opportunities for violence' as factors that enable agents to organise and form a 
significant political force. Opportunities refer to the conditions that effectively reduce 
constraints to cooperation or encourage collective action amongst individuals seeking to 











Views which reflect the rational actor perspective suggest that civil violence is most 
likely where opportunities exist for opposition groups to fund their activities. An 
abundance of resource rents presents this opportunity. Chief proponents of this argument, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005:629), remain agnostic about the motivations or goals of rebels 
which in any case become evident in the course of the conflict (Humphreys, 2005:512). 
Their main concern is the opportunity or feasibility of embarking on a violent campaign 
against government. Resource rents provide the essential funds needed to recruit, train, 
accommodate, feed and pay fighters as well as to obtain arms and disseminate 
propaganda. 
Secondly, the characteristics of the resources in contention determine the opportunities 
available and hence the nature of violent opposition which is likely to occur. Specifically, 
'point resources' which are concentrated in a certain area and require capital-intensive 
extraction are more likely to cause conflict than diffuse resources which are wide spread 
(Auty, 2000:6) because these are often owned and largely enjoyed by only a few. Seizing 
control of poin.t reg'l;lL:O~ from th~ hctltus 8[ L;:o·remrrl~nt cduld i,ro\l: :) he .::dlemely 
valuable. Similarly, lootable resources are more likely to produce conflict than non-
lootable resources because they can be relatively easily extracted and sold by militant 
groups. Nevertheless, rents can be raised indirectly from non-Iootable resources by 
extortion via kidnapping of foreign company officials or threats of vandalisation and 
sabotage. Le Billon (2005) argues that distance from the seat of government or the capital 
also influences the nature of violence that may emerge. Diffuse resources which are 
located near the capital will lead to mass protests while diffuse resources far from the 











resources located near the capital are likely to result in a coup attempt but when located 
far from the centre of power violent protests are intended to drive out government 
presence and resources related businesses and may be associated with secession. 
Proximity to porous national borders out of which resources can be sold and rents 
generated further enhance the prospects for conflict. 
State weakness or outright failure provides a number of favourable opportunities for 
armed conflict. Many developing countries have seen a decline in mortality, while 
fertility has remained high. This trend produced youthful populations in many countries, 
often referred to as 'youth bulges' (Urdal, 2006:6). Urdal has argued that youth bulges 
may increase the risk of organised forms of political violence, such as internal armed 
conflict. As a result of economic decline, a mass of unemployed youth especially young 
men (Hudson & den Boer 2004) represent a readily available recruitment base for rebel 
organisations as they face unemployment, greater access to higher education with limited 
employment opportunities, lack of political openness, and crowding in urban centres 
claims that a relatively large youth population may reduce recruitment costs due to the 
abundant supply of fighting personnel with low opportunity cost or simply nothing better 
to do. According to Collier, rebellion is feasible at a micro-level only when the potential 
personal gain from joining is so high and the anticipated costs are so low that rebel 
recruits will rather join a rebellion than pursue other income-earning opportunities. 
Secondly, state failure defined by the state's inability to monopolise force is precipitated 











generates opportunities for armed conflict. These kinds of personal interventions into 
markets by rulers creates what Reno (2000) has described as 'shadow states'; the 
systematic diversion of public rents by insecure leaders through corrupt patronage 
networks to take advantage of economic interests and coercively protect their tenuous 
hold on power (Reno, 2006: 26). These activities entwine political power with informal 
and clandestine markets (Reno, 2005:134) creating 'shadow states' which in tum become 
fair game to political entrepreneurs; former allies easily and quickly tum into opponents 
when the stakes are high enough. Rulers, no longer able to maintain control over these 
channels of wealth accumulation and distribution, undermine state security agencies and 
threaten national security by fragmenting the use of coercion when they inadvertently 
equip potential challengers. This trend is further heightened in a post-cold war context 
where arms are more readily accessible than in previous periods (DiJohn, 2002:4). 
Finally, shared identity may form the basis for rebel mobilisation. In the case of 'point 
resources' where natural resources are exclusively located in certain region occupied by a 
group bedriq,; a distinctive social identity, ~de"lity 1)ast.:J [llol)ili;.;c::~~)'1 IS highl: likeiy. 
Such groups often represent a relative minority and as a result have limited avenues to 
influence non-violent political outcomes. Quite frequently this identity is based on social 
or kinship bond such as ethnicity or religion but some scholars have argued that 
'horizontal' socio-economic or political status may also form common ground for rebel 
mobilisation (Ballantine & Nitzschke, 2003:3). Ethnic mobilisation tends to be 












This section discusses twelve testable hypotheses about mechanisms linking natural 
resource wealth or dependence to conflict. I consider two dimensions of conflict namely, 
the onset of conflict and its duration. 
The debate about the onset of resource related conflict has consisted of two mam 
arguments. The first of these rests on the choices of individual actors in the conflict. This 
rebel-centric argument suggests that anned actors are motivated either by greed or 
grievance. Those advocating a grievance thesis (Auvinen, 1997; Auvinen & Nafziger, 
2002) reflect behaviouralist views while mechanisms emphasising greed or economic 
incentives derives from the rational actor perspective (Rosser, 2006: 17). The other side of 
the debate about the onset of conflict takes a state-centred approach which suggests that 
civil conflict is borne out of state (or policy) weakness or in some cases functional state 
failure as opposed to the greed or grievances of individual anned actors. The 
hehaviouralist category which cites grievance as the driving force, hehind c0ni~i·t has 
been proposed by political scientists such as Carter (2003), Regan (2003) ahd Stewart 
(2002). On the other hand, the fonner rebel-centric hypothesis -based on greed- has been 
championed by economists, of whom Collier (2000a; 2000b; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998) is 
the most prominent. Scholars such as Auty (2005), Reno (2000; 2005), Pearce (2005) and 
Silberfein (2004) take the state-centric approach to resource related conflicts. 
The twelve hypotheses (eight on onset and four on duration) are listed in Figure 1 and 
taken from the various scholars' accounts of resource based civil conflict. Although, 











have specified each in a directly testable model. I adopt this useful technique (and indeed 
a number of the models) from a paper by Ross (2004b) titled, 'How do Natural Resources 
Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases'; where he also uses the case study 
methodology. Some of the mechanisms I specify are related, as with Ross, none are 
mutually exclusive and they in fact often manifest simultaneously. 
Although I discuss all twelve models in this section, five hypotheses will not be tested in 
the subsequent chapter. Hypotheses 2, 4, 10 and 12 are not relevant given the scope of the 
study and nature of the case, while hypothesis 7 has not been sufficiently specified in the 
literature by its proponents. 6 
Table 1: Hypothesised Causal Mechanisms 
Hypotheses on Onset of Civil Conflict Mechanisms 
1 Looting of resources -i> start up costs funded -i> civil conflict 
2*/\ Futures contract awarded -i> start up costs funded -i> civil conflict 
3 Resource extraction -i> grievances -i> civil conflict 
" Resource wealth -i> foreign llltervention -i> CIvil conflict 
5 Resource wealth -i> incentive for state capture/secession -i> civil 
conflict 
6 Resource wealth -i> elite rent-seeking -i> civil conflict 
7* Resource dependence -i> economic collapse -i> civil conflict 
8 Resource dependence -i> state weakness -i> civil conflict 
Hypotheses on Duration of Civil Conflict Mechanisms 
9 Looting by weaker side -i> conflict financed -i> prolonged conflict 
10*/\ Futures contract by weaker (stronger) side -i> conflict financed -i> 
prolonged (shortened) conflict 












11 War (peace) appears more profitable --i> less incentive for peace 
(war) --i> prolonged (shortened) conflict 
12*" Resource wealth in separatist region --i> commitment problem --i> 
prolonged conflict 
Source: Author's compilation from literature * Not tested in this thesis 1\ Not relevant to case study 
The underlying assumptions of each hypothesis can be specified as follows: 
1. HI: Natural resources increase the probability of civil conflict by providing 
burgeoning civil opposition groups with funds to start a rebellion derived either 
directly by extracting and selling resources or indirectly by extorting money from 
those 'who do. 
• For this hypothesis to hold we should be able to observe civil opposition 
organisations raising funds through the extraction and sale of natural resources 
or by extorting rents from resource firms before embarking on an armed 
struggle. 7 We should observe rebels using the funds raised from looted 
re<;()lJrces to start up their rebellion i.e. buying arms and recruiting fighters in 
:, :'~'.' :~nl numbers to challenge guvclllillent torces. 
2. H2: Natural resource wealth increases the chances of civil conflict by enabling rebel 
organisations to sell future extraction rights to the resources they expect to capture in 
order to raise funds to finance conflict. 
• For this hypothesis to explain the conflict accurately, the case study will show 
that rebel group/s sell extraction rights for resources they hope to capture to 
foreign films or foreign governments before armed conflict begins and use 
proceeds realised to buy arms, train and pay soldiers as well as acquire other 











resources needed to fight and win the pledged resourcess. This mechanism is 
more likely to occur in the case of a secessionist struggle or in an attempt to 
capture the state. 
3. H3: Natural resource abundance makes civil conflict more likely by generating 
grievances over environmental degradation, expropriation of land rights, forced 
migration, inadequate employment opportunities and unmet expectations regarding 
benefits of natural resources. 
• For grievances over resource exploitation to be considered the cause of civil 
violence, we should observe militants criticising resources firms and others 
such as policy makers and state bureaucracies responsible for the negative 
impacts of resource exploitation. The aggrieved groups should also been seen 
to target resource firms aside from their attempts to loot or extort rents. While 
this may not prove that militants are sincerely grievance driven it at least 
highlights that they have concerns other than simply rent-seeking such as 
galvanising sUPi-')rt for their activities from a population for which th~se 
issues are salient.9 
4. H4: Natural resource abundance increases the probability of conflict by increasing 
the chances of foreign intervention to support a rebel movement. 
• Foreign government particularly of neighbouring states may be prepared to 
commit militarily to either party in an intra-state conflict in order to gain 
access to strategic natural resources. For this hypothesis to hold foreign 
8 Originally specified by Ross (2004b) and derived from the DRe case study. This is reputedly the way 
Laurent Kabila was able to overthrow Mobutu 











intervention must be vital to enabling one or more of the key players in the 
conflict whose participation may otherwise have been unfeasible. 10 
5. H5: Natural resource wealth increases the likelihood of conflict by making either the 
state as a whole, or the region resources are concentrated in, more attractive for 
capture than it would otherwise have been. 
• This hypothesis implies that resource wealth creates an incentive to seIze 
political power so as to control valuable resources (Fearon & Laitin, 2003)11. 
In the case of diffuse resources which are spread across disparate regions in 
the country then state capture should be the aim of any civil conflict i.e. rebel 
organisations should seek to topple the government and replace it (Le Billon, 
2005). Where resources are clustered in a single region then rebel groups 
should seek to secede and form an independent state (Ross 2003b) i.e. a 
separatist conflict should ensue. In this case the conflict should begin only 
after exploitable resources have been discovered. For diffuse resources, rebel 
groups should cite mismar1gement of re<;0urce wealth as their reason for 
challenging the government while in a secessionist conflict rebels claim unfair 
distribution of resource wealth. In this mechanism rebels would not 
necessarily attack resource firms as they should not be opposed to resource 
extraction in itself and may hope to engage these firms when their new 
government is formed. 
10 Also originally specified by Ross (2004b) from the cases of Sierra Leone and DRe where Liberia and 
Rwanda respectively intervened 











6. H6: Natural resource abundance increases the possibility of conflict by creating 
incentives for the political elite to engage in harmful rent-seeking behaviour which in 
turn generates opportunities for conflict. 
• Natural resources offer considerable financial rewards to those who control them 
and present an obvious attraction for the politically connected who have sufficient 
resources to extract resource rents for themselves. While political elite are often 
able to create 'legal' means of accessing rents, many also engage in illegal 
activities to achieve these ends. Some scholars have referred to this sort of 
behaviour as predatory. As Silberfein (2004) and Reno (2000) have argued intra-
state conflict could be precipitated by pervasive criminal rent seeking perpetrated 
by political elite leading to the proliferation of arms and other resources necessary 
for rebels to engage the state in conflict. For this hypothesis to hold, the case 
study must show that rebels form or formed part of clandestine networks operated 
by political elite who they now violently oppose and that they were at one point 
~qllipped with arms and funds by m,:'j1b::'fS ufihe ruling das~, 
7. H7: Natural resource dependence increases the risk of civil conflict by making the 
COllllt!)' vulnerable to potentially destabilising economic shocks. 
• According to this hypothesis a fall in the price of the natural resource that the 
country in question relies on will result in an economic crisis which translates 
into a sharp drop in public spending, massive job losses in the non-tradeable 
sector and degrading infrastructure. It is assumed in this situation that as 











increasingly looks to the even less profitable resource sector. Access to 
shrinking resource rents becomes more desperate and may be the subject of 
bitter and violent competition (Gagne, 2005: 1). While an economic crisis and 
increasing unemployment may be easy to observe in a case study, factors that 
influence the choice to take up arms are not as evident. Proponents of this 
mechanism must specify it more clearly before it can be properly tested with 
case studies. 
8. H8: Natural resource wealth increases the chances of civil conflict by weakening a 
state's institutions and making it less equipped to mediate against conflict. 
• This hypothesis rests on the argument that resource dependent states in which 
citizens are largely untaxed tend to be characterised by relatively 
undemocratic governments, weak bureaucracies and high military spending. 
Resource rents are used to undermine or repress dissent; government presence 
in remote rural areas tends to be weak enabling rebel recruitment; and 
distributional disputes abound in a context wheJ'0 the state is larf!t;>ly perceived 
as an agent of distribution. Civil society has little power to induce government 
to build strong and open bureaucracies (Humphreys, 2005:512). Institutions 
which traditionally mediate against conflict such as the judiciary are biased in 
favour of the ruling class. Such repression leaves most of the population with 
no peaceful or democratic means of resolving grievances greatly increasing 
the likelihood of civil conflict. Pearce (2005: 180) argues that under such 
conditions citizens are not inclined to "grant [ the state] monopoly of the 











civil conflict there must be evidence in the case of low rule of law, aggrieved 
groups with no legal or political means to seek redress and that in particular 
government used repressive means to end non-violent opposition before 
violence broke out. 
9. H9: Natural resource wealth tends to prolong conflicts when it provides funding to 
the weaker side but makes it shorter when the stronger side receives a financial boost. 
• When this mechanism is in operation there should be evidence that one side or 
the other raised necessary funds through looting or extortion after the conflict 
began. Ross (2004b) suggests that fighting is more likely to continue if only 
the weaker side loots and more likely to be terminated if the stronger side 
alone has access to rents. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions. The 
first is that engagement will continue as long as the weaker side can afford it. 
Secondly, when the stronger side gains more resources, its relative strength 
increases and thus its ability to achieve a decisive victory. 
10. HI0: Natural resource wealth tends to prolong conflicts H.'hel: ',j" weaker side seN" 
future extraction rights to the resources they hope to capfUl to but shortens conflicts 
when the stronger side raises necessary finance by doing the same. 
• This hypothesis is similar to H9 except that in this case funds are raised from 
selling rights to future resource extraction. This mechanism would typically 
appear in secessionist conflicts. 
11. H 11: Natural resource abundance increases or decreases the duration of conflict by 











• Natural resources could potentially inhibit peace settlements if looting during 
conflict is sufficiently lucrative and cannot go on after a settlement. Fearon 
(2004) suggests that looting in a conflict situation may create principal-agent 
problems within one or both sides of the conflict by giving subordinates a 
reason to perpetuate conflict in order to accumulate personal wealth instead of 
following orders to lay down their arms. Similarly, in a warlord situation some 
rebel groups may agree to a peace deal while others see fewer active 
combatants as an opportunity to acquire a greater share of the loot thereby 
presenting peace brokers with a classic commitment problem. On the other 
hand, if soldiers feel that peace would be more beneficial to them they may 
refuse to fight, forcing their commanders to surrender when they would 
otherwise have chosen to continue fighting. In observing the way this 
hypothesis lengthens conflict, the case study should show not only that 
combatants were gaining personally from the conflict but that high level 
players chose not to sign a peace agreempnt without fi,,,~ being co':~.wnsated 
for the loss of their conflict ventures. Similarly, when the commitment 
problem originates with subordinates or multiple rebel groups, militants 
should be gaining personally from the conflict and the rebel organisation/s 
should suffer discipline and commitment problems making a peace deal 
harder to achieve. When the opposite is the case high level players in the rebel 
organisation would be forced to surrender when it otherwise would not have 











12. Hi2: Natural resources wealth tends to increase the duration of separatist conflicts if 
rebels doubt the government's commitments to grant their region autonomy after 
laying down arms. 
• This hypothesis suggests that when the region seeking autonomy is rich in 
resources, the government is unlikely to grant it the right to self-governance. 
Separatist rebels will anticipate this and delay signing a peace agreement. 
Aside from the fact that this hypothesis is difficult to test as a test requires 
knowledge of the true perceptions of rebels, it is irrelevant for the present case 
study. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter we have seen how resources rents essentially compromise governance in 
resource-rich countries from within -in the case of greedy politicians funding criminal 
gangs and militant groups in order to gain further access to resources and rents- as well as 
;.:xter.!' llv by building up unmitigated grievances between competing social ;:,'TOUpS aBC 
against the government itself. While these factors may generally result in violent conflid, 
the chapter also outlined specific mechanism by which violence occurs and is sustained. 
Motives based on feelings of deprivation and opportunities based on the ability to fund a 
rebellion or significantly challenge the state's monopoly on force, influence a rebel's 
decision to fight and determine the nature of the conflict. Twelve conflict mechanisms 
were delineated from the literature and reflect the rebel-centric behavioural, rebel-centric 












CIVIL CONFLICT IN NIGERIA'S NIGER DELTA 
BAYELSA RIVERS ABJA AKWA IBOM 
Source: Idemudia & Ite, 2006: 392 
Illustration 1: States in the Niger Delta 
Nigeria's huge crude oil deposit, considered among the best quality in the world, IS 
located in its Niger Delta region. The Niger Delta i.e. the delta of the River Niger, 
formerly known as the Oil Rivers and once a major producer of palm oil, covers an area 
of about 75,000 square kilometres or 7.5 per cent of Nigeria's land mass. Its vast wetland 











square kilometres of marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons. Proven gas and oil 
reserves in the Niger Delta were estimated at 4.502 trillion (m3) in 2005 and 36 billion 
(m3) in 2003 I. Historically the Niger Delta, spanned present day Bayelsa, Delta and 
Rivers States. However, in the year 2000, former President Obasanjo expanded its 
definition to include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo States; all of 
which now produce crude oil. The Niger Delta states are located in Nigeria's South-South 
geopolitical zone. Nearly 20 million people from more than 40 ethnic groups and 
speaking some 250 dialects live in the Niger Delta. Their livelihoods are traditionally 
based on fishing and farming. The Ijaw people represent the majority in the region. Other 
ethnic groups include the Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ilaje, Ogoni, Ekwere, Efik, Ibibio etc. 
Nigeria generated roughly US$350 billion between 1965 and 2000 from oil alone (Sala-i-
Martin & Subramanian, 2003:4), amounting to over 90 per cent of the country's total 
foreign earnings in that period. This figure represents the official data, however many 
have argued that the actual figure may be much higher given Nigeria's poor 
documentation practices and pervasive corruption. Nigeria is Africa's largest producer of 
petroleum followed by Libya and Angola respectively. Around 2.51 million2 barrels of oil 
are extracted from the Niger Delta daily. Nigeria earned nearly $30 billion from oil 
exports in 2004 alone3• 
Ironically, Nigeria, the world's tenth largest oil producer, is ranked amongst the 20 
poorest nations in the world. In July 2006, the available statistics indicated that despite 
I Figures sourced from Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2006, Niger Delta Conflict: Basic Facts & 
Analysis, Development House, London 
22004 figures sourced from http://ww~v.inJ9please.C:Qlll~ip_.!LAQ<))?041.html{l2/0S/07) 
3 Quoted from The New York Times, Oil Riches Bring Blood to Nigerian Villages, by Lydia Polgreen, 











official claims to the contrary, over 70 per cent of Nigerians lived in abject poverty, 
surviving on US$l or less per day. Sadly, much of the natural gas extracted from oil 
wells in the Delta has been immediately burned, or flared, into the air for over thirty years. 
Nigeria flares about 75 per cent of its gas daily, that is, between 2 and 2.5 billion standard 
cubic feet, the highest rate in the world (Friends of the Earth 2004). 
Petroleum resources seem to have had little impact on the standard of living for the 
average Nigerian. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003:4) make the observation that: 
In 1965, when oil revenue per capita was about US$33, per capita GDP was 
US$245. In 2000, when oil revenues were US$325 per capita, per capita GDP 
remained at the 1965 level. In other words, all the oil revenues ... did not seem to 
add to the standard of living at all. 
Although statistically poverty levels in the Niger Delta do not appear to be any worse 
than national levels, environmental degradation, the intrusion of mega oil installations 
and the expectations created by the vast resources in the region have resulted in 
perceptions of poverty that far exceed the numbers. Indeed, many have challenged the 
Niger Delta figures reflected in the poverty survey carried out by Nigeria's National 
Bureau of Statistics in 2004 arguing that the reality is significantly different than the data 
suggests (UNDP, 2006:36). Furthermore, household surveys conducted by the Nigerian 
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) in 1996, put poverty in the south-south region at 58.2 
per cent, the highest rate in the country at the time. 
In any case, the true measure of poverty in the region extends beyond income poverty. 
Price regimes in the Niger Delta are often influenced by the comparatively high earnings 
of MNOC workers so that basic services such as housing, transportation, health care, 











To further compound this effect, social and physical infrastructure in the region is either 
in a state of severe disrepair or absent altogether. When defined as a combination of 
nominal income, purchasing power, access to infrastructure and environmental 
degradation, poverty in the Niger Delta is far more acute than the National Bureau of 
Statistics indicates. 
Often the Delta's terrain, Nigeria's most complex, is alluded to by government officials 
as the reason for dismal levels of development in the region. The challenge of 
modernising a delicately balanced ecosystem consisting largely of small, swampy patches 
of land constricted by a dense network of rivers and creeks, considerable in the best of 
circumstances, is further compounded by government's ineptitude and the negative 
impacts of the oil industry. The result is that basic amenities such as electricity, pipe 
borne water, roads and clinics which are standard in many other parts of Nigeria, are 
unavailable in the Niger Delta or deficient and inadequate for the population where they 
exist (ibid:2). 
Widespread underdevelopment in the Niger Delta has remained essentially unchanged by 
numerous government sponsored agencies, programme and projects; ingraining a deep 
sense of mistrust towards the government and MNOCs, who are considered, amongst 
locals, the main beneficiaries of petroleum resources in Nigeria. A complex mix of 
economic, social, political and environmental factors have left Nigeria's Delta region 
impoverished, environmentally devastated and volatile. 
Conflict situations in the Niger Delta range from mmor community protests against 











contlict has only helped to worsen the condition of people living in the Niger Delta as 
lives and property are lost and jobs along with much needed investment are eroded. 
Crime is also on the rise as more and more weapons find their way into the region and 
increasing numbers join the illegal oil trade commonly known in Nigeria as 'oil 
bunkering' . 
In the sections that follow, I discuss the political economic landscape of Nigeria as a 
means of understanding how the paradoxical outcomes in the Niger Delta have arisen. 
Then I take a more detailed look at the escalating contlict in the Niger Delta with 
particular reference to events which took place after the 1999 elections which ushered in 
Nigeria's first civilian government after fifteen years of military rule. Finally, having 
described the case, I test each of the contlict mechanisms from chapter two against the 
facts of the case to detennine which mechanisms most strongly explain the onset and 
persistence of civil contlict in the Niger Delta. 
THE NIGERIAN STATE IN CONTEXT 
Nigeria exists as a unified state in spite of a number of confounding and potentially 
debilitating contradictions. One in particular stands out quite glaringly when the 
country's history is traced, the very resource, petroleum, which nearly divided the state is 
also responsible for keeping it unified- albeit precariously. 
In 1914, the British colonial authorities merged the Northern and Southern protectorates 
of an area in West Africa which they eventually named Nigeria. From that time until 











traditional, patriarchal structure while the South embraced modernity and capitalism to a 
greater extent. Each region regarded the other with some degree of suspicion and pressed 
for separate states in the wake of independence. However, British interests were better 
served by keeping Nigeria unified. Through its alliance with the patriarchal and more 
populous North Britain could maintain control of the valuable resources of a politically 
restive South. So in 1960, after much pressure from the international community the 
colonialists made a hurried exit from Nigeria but not before installing a constitution 
which ensured a Northern majority in parliament (Ylonen, 2005: 53). Eager to take over 
the reins of power, Southern elite, from the East and West, accepted the terms. From the 
onset Nigerian politics has been beset by fragmentation and divisiveness uncharacteristic 
of the political cohesion which ushered many other African countries into independence 
(Bevan et aI, 1999: 189). The three most populous ethnic groups dominated politics in 
their respective regions; the Hausa/Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the East and the 
Y oruba in the West. 
National income during the 1950s & 60s was derived primarily from agricultural exports. 
Incongruously, virtually nothing was ploughed back into the sector to develop farming 
practices or rural communities. Instead a vast majority of the income was spent on urban 
infrastructure and on running government establishments to the effect that while income 
remained relatively stable over the period, expenditure steadily rose. 
These economic changes were taking place amidst severe political upheavals -mainly 
based on ethnicity- including successive military coups in which the North emerged as 











colonial version before it, the Nigerian state under civilian rule tried to maintain societal 
order by force while operating an essentially extractive economy in which little emphasis 
was placed on improving productivity or innovation. Some have argued that the civil war 
marked a decisive turning point in the existence of Nigeria as a single state (Bevan et aI, 
1999; Ayogu, 2000). 
Prior to the civil war the sub-regions within the Nigeria were strong vis-a-vis the state 
and largely independent from it. The maiden constitution stipulated a federal system of 
governance so that upon independence each of the three regions, dominated by one of the 
three largest ethnic groups, had its own governor, premier, civil service and judiciary. In 
addition the principle of derivation in which regions retained a percentage of their 
earnings was held at 50% until 1967. These factors worked together to produce a tenuous 
federal structure subject to the willingness of each region to remain as part of Nigeria 
(Bevan et aI, 1999: 189). Before long the federation was faced with the real threat of 
splitting up and losing its most valuable resource in the bargain. 
The seceSSIOn of the Eastern regIOn and subsequent civil war coincided with the 
discovery of sizable deposits crude oil much of which was located in the departing region. 
Where previously, the Northern region had agitated for a separate state, the discovery of 
oil suddenly presented a very compelling argument to keep Nigeria unified and indeed to 
strengthen the federal government apparatus which it controlled. 
The civil war ended with the surrender of the East and the threat of secession finnly laid 
to rest. By this time three regions had grown to become 12 states. In 1976, the 12 states 











of states paralleled the increasing expropriation of all revenue including oil revenue by 
the federal government. Two oil booms during the 1970s meant a massive expansion of 
the federal purse. By the end of the decade the federal government had become just about 
the only source of income for individual states; less than 3 per cent of its expenditure was 
realised by each state (Bevan et aI, 1999: 61). A UNDP Report on the Niger Delta 
released in 2006 (13-14) summarises the erosion of the derivation policy as follows: 
... 50 per cent of the proceeds from minerals, including mineral oil, went to the 
region from where they were extracted; 30 per cent went into a pool for 
distribution to all regions, including the producing regions; and 20 per cent went 
to the Federal Government . ... After the civil war led to the political and fiscal 
centralization of the federal system, the military administration of General 
Yakubu Gowon promulgated Petroleum Decree No. 51 in 1969. This put the 
ownership and control of all petroleum resources in, under or upon any land in 
Nigeria under the control of the Federal Government. It meant that individuals, 
communities, local governments and even states with land containing minerals 
were denied their rights to the minerals. Between 1969 and 1971, the military 
government, fighting an expensive civil war, expropriated five per cent from the 
50 per cent meant for the producing states, thereby bringing the Distributable 
Pool Amount to 55 per cent, while 45 per cent was for the producing states. 
During the administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo (as he was then), from 
1976 to 1979, a distinction was made between onshore and offshore proceeds, 
with all offshore proceeds going into the Distributable Pool Amount. In addition, 
the share of the onshore proceeds in the pool was raised to 80 per cent, while 
producing states were allocated the balance of 20 per cent. Between 1982 and 
1992, derivation accounted for merely 1.5 per cent of oil proceeds. Under the 
military regime of General Sani Abacha, from 1993 to 1998, derivation was 
raised to three per cent ... pending the determination of an appropriate derivation 
formula by the Constitutional ... The Conference recommended a 13 per cent ... 
which was ... really implemented until General Abdulsalami Abubakar ... 
The first and second (current) democratic administrations have maintained derivation at 
13 per cent. In 2005 a National Political Reform Conference attempted to address the 
thorny issue of derivation. The House recommended an increase to 17 per cent but the 
Niger Delta delegates found this unacceptable insisting on 25 per cent. The talks reached 











The systematic dissolution of federalism in Nigeria -in practice though not in theory- not 
only concentrated power at the centre but steadily removed any incentive states may have 
had to invest in sustainable income generating programmes. Rents from oil essentially 
provided every state with 'free' income and derivation levels of 3, 1.5 or 0 per cent 
hardly made the effort of independent income generation worthwhile for any state. Since 
the breakdown of derivation in the 1970s, Nigeria essentially functions as a rentier state, 
depending almost exclusively on oil rents, taxes and royalties (Omeje, 2004: 428). 
Politics in the 1970s was still very much haunted by the regional/ethnic tensions of the 
previous decades and still controlled by the three dominant groups. Civil servants are still 
required to indicate their ethnic origins on employment forms (Kalu, 1996: 240). Kalu 
recounts an infamous quote by the Minister for Transport under General Abacha's rule: 
" ... and if people think that because 1 am a minister that 1 have forgotten the fact 
that one, I'm an Ilesha man, two, I'm an ljesha man, and third, I'm a Yoruba man, 
then fourth, 1 am a Nigerian citizen, then such people should really go and 
examine themselves. 1 cannot divorce myself from the yearning and aspirations of 
the people of my roots. " 
Indeed during the years of military rule a number of constitutional changes were 
introduced to eliminate polarisation along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, combined with a 
derivation policy that effectively quashed productivity, a fall in world prices for 
agricultural produce and a massive oil boom, politics in Nigeria degenerated into sheer 
patronage. Political office holders maintained their positions not by effectively 
representing their constituencies to bring about better living standards, but by distributing 
largesse to a small group of their supporters (Bevan et aI, 1999: 91). Two forces came 
into play to constitute a marked disadvantage for ethnic minorities including those from 











and ethno-exclusionist interests of dominant elite forces" and the transfer of rents to a 
narrow set of individuals (government contractors and party supporters) from within 
those wider ethnic constituencies (Bevan et aI, 1999: 56 & 91). Evidence shows, however, 
that vast amounts of rents realised in Nigeria were and are still being appropriated by 
public officials and their cronies to personal accounts, many of them foreign. Bevan et al 
(1999: 95) record that during civilian rule from 1979-83, capital flight had amounted to 
N18 billion and a UNIDO Report released in 2004 estimated that by 1999, Nigeria had an 
estimated $107 billion of its private wealth in foreign banks. This figure represents 70 per 
cent of the country's total private wealth. Such were the levels of mismanagement and 
ineptitude during the oil boom of the 1970s that elected officials would openly vote 
themselves large sums of money and benefits at the federal and state tiers; a practice 
which continues to this day. Predictably distributional politics of this nature encouraged 
the creation of more and more states to which rents could be allocated and through which 
minority elite could realise their own political ambitions (Bevan et aI, 1999: 188). 
Aside from the direct diversion of funds, public expenditure was decided on the basis of 
regional balance of power. An empirical study by Ayogu (2000) showed that the groups 
with the most political power namely the North followed by the South-West were able to 
direct resources to their localities to the detriment of other regions. The study indicated 
that the oil producing region of the South-South were the worst losers in terms of 
infrastructural investment. Table 2 shows the geo-political zones which have produced 
heads of state in Nigeria and Appendix A summaries Nigeria's political leadership since 
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Even under Nigeria's new democracy, legacies from Babangida's regIme linger to 
perpetuate predatory rule; the institutionalisation of repreSSIOn, empowered state 
intelligence and security forces, politically backed illicit activity (such as oil smuggling) 
as well as the erosion of public institutions like the judiciary amongst other features. 
Nigeria today, is still only a nominal democracy with all the trappings of a Weberian state 
including a formal bureaucracy and legal system but which in reality is controlled (often 
through coercion) by a small elite network advancing their own parochial interests (Lewis, 
1996: 99; Omotola, 2006: 7). In a significant shift from the civil military relations of the 
1960s and 70s, Nigeria post-Babangida, has become stage for elite sanctioned illegality, 
personalised, authoritarian control of politics and economic, and growing social 
inequality (Lewis, 1996: 97). The World Bank reports that 80 per cent of Nigeria's oil 
revenues accrue to only one per cent of the population while the remaining 20 per cent is 
shared by 99 per cent of the population (World Bank, 2004). Despite commendable 
efforts under democracy to stabilise and clean up the economy there is still a strong 
inclination towards political rather than market allocation. As such the political will to 
meaningfully reverse the status quo by strengthening institutions is low (Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003: 14; Omotola, 2006: 7). 
The discovery oil, having effectively discredited the derivation principle, has created a 
near absolute dependency; so that neither the state nor its dominant elite could survive 
without oil. In light of this common interest, Ukiwo (2003: 129) observes that in 
Nigeria's case it is difficult to separate government from state or state from the ruling 











constant contestation by it own citizenry. The troubles in the Niger Delta represent one 
arena of this contest where the state has responded with oppression. Omeje (2004: 429) 
aptly surmises: 
The element of oppression of subjects or to state more appropriately, the use of 
military violence against domestic threats is, in fact, a dominant characteristic of 
the state. Dating from its colonial origins, military violence has remained a 
principal method of the Nigerian state's response to domestic security threats, a 
phenomenon that further complicates the contestation of its authority and 
legitimacy by disaffected individuals, social groups and subnational forces. 
Moreover, the state has rarely ever had any sense of proportion in the application 
and use of military violence. The strategic nature of oil to the economic survival 
of the state and to the prosperity of its dominant elite factions practically 
heightens the prospects of the state's use of military violence against oil-related 
threats and conflict in the present historical conjuncture. Beleaguered and 
desperate, the state is scarcely impartial in its management of domestic threats 
and social conflicts. 
THE NEXT GULF: CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA4 
The history of violence in Nigeria's Delta region, post independence, dates back to the 
revolt in January of 1966 led by Isaac Boro. This insurrection, in protest against the 
marginalisation of the Niger Delta people, was put down within twelve days and marked 
the first case of armed resistance against the Nigerian state by peoples of the Niger Delta. 
From that time until the late 1990s violence in the region was restricted to small scale 
skirmishes between and within the various ethnic groups in the region. 
After the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others involved in the peaceful movement 
for human and environmental rights of the Ogoni people in 1995 by the General Sani 
Abacha regime, the international community began to take notice of the Niger Delta. In 
1997, following the death of General Abacha and the re-emergence of local politics, 
4 This title was taken from the book by "The Next Gulf: London, Washington and Oil Conflict in Nigeria" 
(2005) by Rowell, Maniot & Stockman. The section draws from the book as well as from newspaper, 











intense inter-ethnic violence between the Ijaw, Itsekiri and the Urhobo arose over who 
would control the oil city of Warri and the vast oil rents that accrued to it. 
By the following December the Ijaw struggle for greater control of petroleum resources 
and the redress of the negative consequences of oil extraction had progressed to into the 
formation of the ljaw Youth Council (lYC) and its Kaiama Declaration 5. The IYC 
formalised resistance against the status quo articulating concerns of the loss of control 
over ljaw homelands and proposing specific actions to be taken. In a letter to all the oil 
companies, the IYC called for the immediate suspension of all oil related activity and a 
withdrawal from Ijaw territory until a consensus between all affected parties could be 
reached. 
In the spirit of the late Saro-Wiwa's legacy the IYC pledged to stage a peaceful struggle 
for self-determination and environmental justice. 'Operation Climate Change' was 
launched on December 28 in the Bayelsa state capital, Yenagoa. On the 30th of December 
1998, over ten thousand Nigerian troops opened fire and released tear gas on two 
thousand youth taking part in a peaceful procession through Yenagoa. A number of the 
young protesters were killed and a state of emergency was subsequently declared on the 
state. 
A few short days later, one hundred soldiers assigned to a Chevron facility attacked two 
Ijaw communities in Delta state killing dozens including children before setting the towns 
ablaze. Over the following months various communities around the Niger Delta were 
invaded by state security forces; local residents were terrorised and brutalised while many 











others were killed or detained. Nevertheless, 'Operation Climate Change' continued to 
upset oil production well into 1999 as youth turned off pipeline valves around the Delta. 
Then in November of 1999, five short months into Nigeria's new democracy, troops were 
sent into the small town of Odi, ostensibly to track down a criminal gang that had taken 
refuge in Odi after abducting and killing a group of seven policemen. The soldiers were 
authorised to 'shoot-on-sight'; two days after their arrival in Odi, over 2000 civilians 
were reported killed or missing6 • Statements given by various government officials in the 
aftermath indicate that the event was premeditated and carried out under executive 
instruction. Although the origins of the conflict were unrelated to oiF, the government 
later justified it as an effort to '[protect} lives and property- particularly oil platforms, 
flow stations, operating rig terminals and pipelines, refineries and power installations in 
the Niger Delta >8. 
Within days of the Odi cnSlS, the bill for the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NOD C) sent to the National Assembly by President Obasanjo was quickly ratified 
(Ukeje, 2001a: 33). However, over the years an armed militancy emerged in the Delta 
that the government was largely unable to contain. Low level conflict continued in the 
regIOn on and off until 2003 with considerable costs to human life, communities and 
property. 
6 Reports vary on the exact numbers of victims of the Odi massacre. Main sources, ERA (2002) and HRW 
(1999), however, agree that at least hundreds of lives were lost or unaccounted for by the end of the 
invasion and that the entire town of Odi was razed to the ground save for a bank, a clinic and a church. 
7 The abducted policemen had gone to Odi to investigate rumours that some Ijaw youths were mobilising to 
join fellow Ijaw youth based in Lagos in reprisal attacks on the ethnic Yoruba organisation, Odua People's 
Congress. See Omeje (2006) for a detailed review of this incident and what he terms the 'oilification' of 
conflict in the Niger Delta. 
8 Remarks made by the Defence Minister, on 25 November 1999, five days after the invasion and 











A significant escalation occurred in 2003 during the elections when thugs were used to 
intimidate assault and sometimes assassinate political opposition and secure votes. In 
2004 a series of events took place in the Niger Delta which rocked the international oil 
markets. Former leader of lye, turned vote rigger, turned Ijaw militant, Mujahid 
Dokubo-Asari, withdrew to the creeks to wage "all-out-war" against the government and 
the oil companies after a fall out with his benefactor and then state Governor, Peter Odili. 
The relationship between Asari and Odili (as well as other political leaders) was first 
formed as Asari rose to prominence within the lye (HRW 2005). Asari, a vocal member 
of a rather more militant wing of the lye which itself was a loosely organised amalgam 
of pro-Ijaw groups, was sponsored by members of the Rivers and Bayelsa state 
governments to win the presidency of the lYe. At one point reports were that the Rivers 
state government had contracted the services of the lye to secure oil installations in the 
Kalabari area of the state. Reports say that Odili initially armed and funded Asari to 
provide security for legitimate and illegitimate oil related activities as well as act as his 
political enforcer but following some disputes between the two allegedly over oil 
bunkering spoils as well as Asari's outspoken anti-government views, the latter formed a 
group known as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) made up of 
unemployed and disaffected youths from university fraternities and local gangs. 
According to one account by James Briggs for IntelliBriefs 9, an online source for 
geopolitical and security news, although Asari expressed many sophisticated arguments 
for Niger Delta self-determination, many of his members were simply going along with 
him because they had lost a turf war with another local gang leader, Ateke Tom. After 
9 James Briggs, "Guide to the Armed Groups Operating In the Niger Delta-part 2" 











retreating into the creeks, Asari, who still maintained relationships with many 
government officials from who he received regular tip-offs, funded his operations 
through oil bunkering. 
When the state began arming Ateke and his followers then known as the Niger Delta 
Vigilantes (NDV), severe conflict broke out between the two groups resulting in the loss 
of as many as 500 lives, most of which were of unarmed civilians, before a truce was 
reached. Interestingly, when state security forces eventually got involved, they did so by 
cooperating with the NDV against the NDPVF. The heavy fighting as well as Asari's 
threats to the Nigerian oil industry helped to raise New York oil-futures prices above an 
unprecedented $50 pb. Finally after some months of uneasy calm in the region Asari was 
arrested in 2005 and charged with treason. Ateke on the other hand continued to enjoy 
good relations with key government officials until he too fell out of favour with his 
patrons and was forced into hiding. 
The arrest of Asari in 2005 was followed by the rise of a new militia, the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) as well as many other groups that operated 
with increasing boldness and intensity to inflict damage on the oil industry and the state. 
MEND kidnaps foreign oil workers, kills Nigerian troops and attacks major oil 
installations. Their activities have led to a 20% decline in Nigeria's overall oil production. 
Its stated demands include the release of imprisoned political leaders, an end to 
government corruption, a greater share of oil revenues, and compensation for 
environmental damage. Initially MEND's bombing and kidnapping raised some alarm 











financially. However the highly porous nature of militant group membership in the Delta 
has meant that criminal gangs have carried out kidnappings for ransom in the name of 
MEND. Although the organisation has stressed that their aim is not to kill civilians or 
even Nigerian armed forces personnel, but to force oil companies to leave the delta 
thereby crippling the Nigerian economy and forcing reform, it endorses the propagation 
of criminal gangs in the region saying they help to make the Niger Delta ungovernable. In 
spite of its seemingly laudable public declarations, MEND has admitted to taking money 
from oil companies lO • 
The number of kidnappings in the regIOn increased exponentially in the 18 months 
following MEND's first high profile kidnap of Shell workers in January of 2006. As a 
result many MNOCs have evacuated their staff from Port Harcourt the city in Rivers state 
where most of the civil conflict is now concentrated. MNOCs worst hit by the violence 
have been ENI Spa, Chevron and Shell. Exxonmobil whose installations are mainly 
offshore and located in the relatively calm Akwa Ibom state has suffered little loss. 
The response by the Nigerian State to this mounting conflict to date has been twofold. 
First was to strengthen troop presence in the region under a Joint Task Force (JTF) 
comprising the army, navy and air force and then subsequently to buy off militant group 
and gang leaders at the local and regional level. Neither approach has worked. 
Compounded by their involvement in oil bunkering, the Nigerian military have proved no 
match for guerrilla bands who manoeuvre quickly and easily through the creeks on speed 
10 James Briggs, "Guide to the Anned Groups Operating In the Niger Delta" 
(ht!rr:1! nteII i hri efs.h logspot.com!2007 ;04{gtIj_d_~~ to-<!.IJ1}ed::Rrou Qs-operatin g- in? g.html & 












boats. Secondly, for each militant leader who is paid off, dozens of others are ready to 
replace him and perpetrate greater levels of violence in order to justify their own payoff 
(UNDP, 2006). These strategies have also been political failures as the government finds 
it more and more difficult to justify increasing spending on military hardware to fight the 
militants instead of developing the region which most perceive as the primary cause of 
unrest in the region. In addition emerging reports of military and government officials 
involved in oil bunkering and collecting on ransom payouts have eroded some of the 
state's high ground regarding conflict in the region. 
EMERGING TRENDS OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT 
A number of disturbing trends have arisen in the context of civil conflict in the Niger 
Delta. Indeed some existed before armed conflict began but they all help to aggravate the 
violence. Six of them feature quite prominently and highlight the dynamics between the 
various interest groups operating in the Niger Delta: 
• Proliferation of arms 
The conflict in the Niger Delta has in no small way been exacerbated by the 
widespread availability of small arms in the region. Small arms and light weapons 
are readily available for purchase all over the Delta but Warri, the capital city of Delta 
State, in particular, appears to be a major focal point for weapons sales. In 2004 a 
report for the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) noted as much 
(Peel, 2005:2-3). Weapons range from machetes and cutlasses, to pistols, shotguns, 
semi automatic rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers. In some cases militants are 











Militants interviewed by HR W admitted that many of their weapons were provided 
by sponsors including members of the state's government, political parties or 
individuals involved in oil bunkering. The implication is that when armed youth are 
not providing security for bunkering operations, they possess the means to fight each 
other and cause general mayhem and unrest in the region. 
Some of the weapons have been used previously in other West African conflicts and 
have entered the Delta via land or sea routes. Others still are stolen or purchased from 
the state's security forces. Although Nigeria is a signatory to the moratorium on trade 
or manufacture small arms or light weapons in West Africa, little progress has been 
made in determining the extent of the problem and guarding against it (HRW, 2005:9). 
• Proliferation of armed groups 
There is a perplexing variety of armed groups emerging and operatmg in the Niger 
Delta today. These groups, whose aims and members often overlap, range from 
community vigilantes to armed political movements to criminal gangs to political 
enforcers. Their activities include kidnapping, theft of crude oil, attacking oil 
infrastructure, extortion, bombings, murders and rigging elections. With few 
employment opportunities and virtually none offering the lucrative rewards of gang or 
militant group membership, recruitment levels are high and unskilled youth, 
secondary school boys and even university graduates form a ready base ll . 
In addition to Asari's NDPVF and Ateke's NDV, there are, according to the various 
state governments, more than 100 smaller armed groups, such as the Ijaw 
Revolutionary Force, Bush Boys, Icelanders, Greenlanders, KKK, Germans, Dey 











Gbam, Mafia Lords, and Vultures. Many of these smaller groups started out as 
university fraternities locally known as 'cults'. Other large groups include MEND, 
which is often perceived as a combination of many smaller groups which come 
together on an ad hoc basis l2 ; the Ebgesu Boys named after the Ijaw god of war; and 
the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC). 
HR W (2006) attributes the proliferation of armed groups in the region to several key 
factors including corrupt politics, unemployment and poverty, a culture of impunity in 
Nigeria or the absence of the rule of law, oil bunkering, corporate payouts and 
availability of weapons. 
While many gang members and militants admit to being armed by their leaders some 
claim to have received arms from politicians during election season. Given the 
involvement of political office holders and the poor state of the police force in 
Nigeria there appears to be neither the readiness nor political will to tackle the 
problem effectively. 
• Oil Bunkering 
The practice of removing petroleum products from oil pipelines and well-heads, 
without authorisation from either oil companies or the government, is commonly 
referred to in Nigeria as 'oil bunkering'. Involving large-scale smuggling operations 
that use road tankers, barges and large ships offshore, oil bunkering or simply 
bunkering, has become one of the most serious contributors to the conflict in the 
12 James Briggs, "Guide to the Anned Groups Operating In the Niger Delta-part 2" 
http://intellibrief<;.blogspot.com!2007/0:Lg~LiQQ=-tQ-anned-groups-operatin!>.-in2S.html; United Press 
International, interview with Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, November 122007 











Delta. It is also responsible for the loss of hundreds of millions, of not billons of US 
dollars in national revenue on an annual basis. Various groups including international 
crime syndicates, local businessmen, politicians, military personnel, oil company 
officials and militants are said to be involved in the illegal trade which is claimed to 
have been tolerated at low levels for many years (HR W, 2005: 8; Peel, 2005: 11). 
Reports indicate that bunkering now accounts for losses of between 100,000 and 
300,000 barrels per day (Cesarz et aI, 2003: 3) or 10% to 15% of national output. 
However, an internal Shell report places this figure as being as high as 685,000 
barrels per day generating between $1.5bn and $4bn annually (ibid.). 
Dokubo-Asari, a self confessed 'bunkerer' has argued that bunkering when done by 
local people should not be considered theft as the resource belongs to them 13 • Not 
surprisingly his view has won much support in the Delta. While bunkering may hold 
some degree of legitimacy amongst the region's locals it is no doubt a destructive 
trend which feeds others such as illegal anns trafficking, gang turf wars and electoral 
fraud. Not to mention official complicity in oil bunkering which undennines the 
government's efforts to stem civil conflict in the Niger Delta and erodes public 
support for the state. However, it should be noted that the youth who fonn the new 
militia groups were not themselves proprietors of oil bunkering operations before 
wider spread violence took effect in the early 2000s. Ikelegbe (2005: 226) points out 
that bunkering operations, prohibitively capital intensive and could not have been 
carried out independently by these youth who used intensifying violence as leverage 
to amass sufficient levels of rents for bunkering operations. These factors lead 











Ikelegbe and other observers to conclude that from the 1980s when bunkering first 
began to the late 1990s, oil theft in Nigeria was funded and operated by criminal 
syndicates linked to military and government elite who could afford the entry and 
running costs. 
Observers say that much of the oil bunkering is conducted openly, using state military 
personnel to escort barges out to sea (Peel, 2005: 11; Briggs, 2007). In January 2005 
two rear-admirals were dismissed after a military court found them guilty of 
involvement in the disappearance of an impounded tanker that had been shipping 
stolen oil from the Delta in 2003. The government has appeared to combat the 
practice over the last few years. However, although many bunkering barges are 
claimed to have been seized, arrests and prosecutions remam low. With the 
involvement of highly influential people in oil bunkering (Okonta, 2005: 204-5), 
political will to decisively address the core of the problem is superficial and instead 
government forces deflect attention by publicly brutalising youth at the periphery of 
these activities (lkelegbe, 2005: 224). 
• Kidnapping 
From around 1998 and perhaps in response to the ease in military presence in the 
region following General Abacha's death, local youth began abducting and 
kidnapping MNOC workers, particularly foreign nationals for ransom. This practice 
has been especially pervasive in the core oil producing states of Delta, Rivers and 
Bayelsa. Reports indicate that the kidnappings are carried out in conjunction with 
crime syndicates and local militant groups. Known criminals have been openly 
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Kidnapping has grown into a massive industry in the Niger Delta, as local gangs, 
ransom negotiators (middle men) and government officials exchange vast sums of 
money for the release of MNOC workers. Many of the states within the Niger Delta 
now set aside an undisclosed amount of state funds for special security needs from 
which ransom payments are made. Some reports have suggested that local officials 
orchestrate abductions in order to access and misappropriate funds from the security 
allocation. 
• Corrupt Politics 
The transition to democracy in 1999 saw a rise in youth militancy as unscrupulous 
politicians hired many from the vast pool of unemployed youth around the country to 
violently guarantee their victory at the polls. Following this precedence all parties, but 
most effectively the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), recruited and armed 
members of youth groups to intimidate opposition politicians and their supporters in 
subsequent elections (2003 and 2007). During the April 2007 local and federal 
elections, about 65 people were reported killed in country-wide in political violence. 
Assassinations were rife in the months leading up to the elections. In Port Harcourt 
only a few months after the new government had been sworn in, rival gangs battled it 
out on the streets for control of the city and the political patronage it comes with. 
According to a local observers monitoring the 2003 elections, levels of violence in 
Rivers State during the elections was akin to "a low intensity armed 
struggle .... [W]eapons and firearms of various types and sophistication were freely 
used", (HRW, 2005:4). Other national and international monitors also recorded high 











conclusion that basic standards for a democratic election were not met. It is a widely 
held opinion in Nigeria that the emergence of militant groups in the Niger Delta is 
closely related to politics, corruption and bad governance and that impending 
elections tend to strengthen pre-existing armed groups. 
Community leaders and opposition party members have alleged that Ateke's NDV at 
the behest of the then Federal Transport Minister and senior member of PDP, Abiye 
Sekibo, effectively eliminated all opposition in Okrika, Rivers State. In exchange, 
Ateke was given free rein to carry out bunkering activities. On the other hand, Asari 
while he was in the leadership of the IYC was used by Sekibo and former state 
governor, Peter Odili to limit the growing influence of the group and ensure the 
governor's re-election in 2003. These dealings although highly reported by local 
papers have been vehemently denied by the former governor. 
• Militarisation of the Delta 
Observers have described the Niger Delta as being under siege (UNDP, 2006: 111). 
The Vice President himself referred to the Delta region as a war zone l4 • Spates of 
violent confrontation between rival militant and cult groups as well as between state 
security forces and militants are interspersed with periods of uneasy calm. Soldiers 
patrol the towns and their surrounding creeks particularly in Port Harcourt where 
much of the recent civil conflict has been concentrated. Following severe gang 
violence in the city during 2007, the Rivers State governor called for military 
intervention and a curfew was imposed in the state capital. In addition to this, every 











rural area has a military monitor. State security agents routinely invade, often 
decimating, communities suspected of harbouring wanted militants. 
A JTF was instituted by the previous administration to patrol the region's creeks in an 
attempt to put a stop to oil theft and abductions. This force still remains active in spite 
of its very limited success. The Nigerian government has consistently responded with 
undue military force to the crises in the region; a strategy which even the commander 
of the JTF admits is no solution at alPs. 
The combination of numerous armed militants and the state's security forces has 
made the Delta now more militarised than ever before. Sadly, the worst affected by 
this development are innocent and unarmed citizens who suffer displacement and the 
risk of being caught in the crossfire. The fact that oil companies are permitted to 
retain supernumerary police means that even non-violent protests may be met with 
stark force. Many peaceful community protests have met extreme police brutality 
prompted by the MNOCs. 
Ignoring wide spread OpInIOnS to the contrary, the government has persisted in 
deploying military and reinforced police troops to the region in an attempt to suppress 
the civil conflict. 
TESTING THE MECHANISMS 
In assessing the case, three major waves of civil conflict (i.e. forms of violence against 
the State) are clearly distinguishable over the last ten years; i) the period of the Warri 











Crisis which persisted intensely for over two years and then intermittently until 2003; ii) 
the period immediately following the Kaiama Declaration after which violence in Bayelsa 
state subsided considerably and; iii) the current conflict taking place within the context of 
Nigeria's fledgling democracy. Our present concern lies with the third and current 
conflict which saw a marked tuning point during the confrontation between the NDPVF, 
the NDV and the State. This period has been characterised by diffuse, persistent and 
increasingly intense conflict and rent seeking. 
Militant groups were initially formed based on ethnicity but increased funding and arms 
have greatly expanded recruitment sharply raising the number of armed groups that give 
Nigerian authorities untold pains. Many militants in the region alternate between these 
various groups. Presently the lines between purely profit motivated criminal gangs and 
politically motivated militant groups is significantly blurred as most appear to scramble 
for ransom payouts and political patronage. In contrast, around the time of the Kaiama 
Declaration there were sporadic attacks on oil installations and frequent confrontations 
with the state security forces where the latter clearly had the upper hand. 
Overall, the current conflict shows no convmcmg evidence that looting could have 
brought it on; neither was there evidence of the grievance mechanism. Predatory rent 
seeking by the elite appears to feature very strongly in spurring on the current wave of 
violence; while there is some support of the state weakness mechanism for explaining the 
onset of civil conflict over Nigeria'S recent democratic dispensation. Observations for the 
current conflict are juxtaposed with the previous two major incidences of violence in the 











Onset of Conflict 
Looting 
H 1: Natural resources increase the probability of civil conflict by providing burgeoning 
civil opposition groups with funds to start a rebellion derived either directly by extracting 
and selling resources or indirectly by extorting money from those who do. 
By 2003 oil bunkering had become common practice in the Niger Delta with leaders of 
larger militant groups admitting to benefiting from the illegal trade. Many also had 
financiers in politics and received arms and income for work as political enforcers. If the 
outbreak of civil conflict was brought on by looting then having acquired some funds and 
arms, militants should have been seen engaging the state in a struggle for control of the 
Delta. However, fighting only broke out following disputes with a major financial 
supporter of one of the largest militant groups in the region. Further, when the conflict 
began it was between two rival militant groups. Only subsequently did state forces 
become involved. Thus where the looting mechanism predicts that conflict should occur 
after sufficient rents have been accumulated to start it, the case shows that conflict only 
occurred after the accumulation of rents by one major militant organisation was somehow 
threatened. 16 
Grievance 
H3: Natural resource abundance makes civil conflict more likely by generating 
grievances over environmental degradation, expropriation of land rights, forced 
migration, inadequate employment opportunities and unmet expectations regarding 
benefits of natural resources. 
16 HRW (2005) Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria's River~Stale, Human Rights Watch 











While many militant groups cite environmental degradation, expropriation of land rights, 
and inadequate employment opportunities as reasons for their actions many are linked to 
the government officials and politicians through patronage as well as being actively 
involved in oil bunkering and extortion resulting in a mixed outcome for the grievance 
mechanism. 
Secession 
H5: Natural resource wealth increases the likelihood of conflict by making either the 
state as a whole, or the region resources are concentrated in, more attractive for capture 
than it would otherwise have been. 
Although most known oil deposits in Nigeria are concentrated in the Niger Delta region 
and militants have expressed the desire for greater autonomy and 'self-determination', all 
prominent militant groups in the Niger Delta have always maintained their desire for the 
region to remain a part of Nigeria. This discounts the secession mechanism playing out at 
any point in this case. 
Predatory rent-seeking 
H6: Natural resource abundance increases the possibility of conflict by creating 
incentives for the political elite to engage in harmful rent-seeking behaviour which in 
turn generates opportunities for conflict. 
This mechanism appears to have been salient in the onset of the current civil conflict. It 
has been widely reported that oil theft rackets controlled by politicians, retired and 
serving military officers and local and international criminal syndicates hire and arm 
local youth to secure and defend their operations (RWI, 2007; Zalik, 2006; HRW, 2005; 











Nigerian Oil Crisis, Asari and Ateke, were both unscrupulously linked to politicians and 
government officials. Consistent with many newspaper and eye witness reports, Sara Igbe, 
a Rivers State official, revealed that the state governor at the time, Peter Odili, had 
initially armed Asari17. Many believe that oil bunkering has been a reality for many years 
but volumes of theft have increased rapidly since the late 1990s coinciding with 
democratisation in Nigeria. It is on record that election periods are accompanied by a 
spike in the number of weapons circulating around the Niger Delta; MNOCs have also 
reported increased losses from oil bunkering over those same periods (Peel, 2005: 12). 
Income and arms from oil theft orchestrated by political elite created ample opportunity 
for civil conflict in the Niger Delta. 
State weakness 
H8: Natural resource wealth increases the chances of civil conflict by weakening a 
state's institutions and making it less equipped to mediate against conflict. 
State weakness helped to bring on civil conflict in three ways. Firstly, the absence of the 
rule of law meant that oil bunkering, a practice which both provided the means and 
constituted an incentive for conflict could not be checked. The weakness of law making 
and law enforcement institutions in Nigeria meant not only that illegal activity could not 
controlled but also that legal and peaceful means of dispute settlement and balancing 
social interests were ineffective. In addition, the state's record of regulating the oil 
industry was abysmal leading to many of the conditions that cause feelings of deprivation 
amongst the people of the Niger Delta. Secondly, the aggrieved millions in the Niger 
Delta had experienced two failed electoral processes effectively laying any faith they may 
17James Briggs, "Guide to the Anned Groups Operating In the Niger Delta- part I" 












have had in democracy as a viable means to settle their grievances. Nigeria's second 
round of elections had taken place shortly before violence broke out in 2003. Asari cited 
election malpractice and its implications for the fate of his people as one of his 
justifications for "waging all out war" against the oil industry. The breakdown of the 
constitutional reform process was highly indicative of the weakness of the Nigerian state. 
The first two conditions lead to a third which effectively guaranteed civil conflict; the 
State no longer held a monopoly on force leaving it susceptible to challenge. 
Table 4: Onset of Conflict 
1st Conflict No Yes No Yes Yes 
2/1d C ifl· on lct No Yes No No Yes 
Current No Mixed No Yes Yes 
Conflict 
Duration of Conflict 
Looting 
H9: Natural resource wealth tends to prolong conflicts when it provides funding to the 
weaker side but makes it shorter when the stronger side receives a financial boost. 
Looting has occurred in earnest since the start of the conflict. Many militants now run 
profitable bunkering operations themselves, selling fuel at cheaper rates to locals in the 
region. The incidence of abductions for ransom of oil workers has also escalated to 
unprecedented levels. With MNOCs evacuating all non-essential staff from the most 











More recently politicians and highly placed government officials have been affected as 
well. 
However, it is interesting to note that as with oil bunkering, so called militants work in 
the kidnapping industry as hired hands by government officials who negotiate hefty 
ransom payments and pocket huge sums as 'commission'. 
Funds received from these activities had ensured that militants groups and gangs are able 
to sustain their resistance against the state. 
Incentive 
H 11: Natural resource abundance increases or decreases the duration of conflict by 
giving combatants an incentive to prolong the conflict or end it. 
Profiteering from the conflict has created strong incentives on many sides to perpetuate it. 
With oil prices on the increase, MNOCs in spite of the disruptions and insecurity they 
suffer have an incentive to tum a blind eye to an illegal oil trade which helps fuel a 
conflict that keeps the price of their product up. Politicians, military officers and 
government officials continue to benefit from the lawlessness and 'special security needs' 
that exist in the Niger Delta. Most of the states in the Delta enjoy the privilege of a 
special security vote which is not subject to oversight. As long as crisis persists in the 
Delta government officials can misappropriate public funds virtually unchallenged under 
the guise of a special security budget. Finally, militants and gang members in the Delta 
have become so accustomed to the large and unrealistic incomes earned from conflict 











faced with the prospect of unemployment at best and prosecution at worst they have 
every reason to maintain the status quo. 
Recent efforts by the new vice-president of Nigeria who hails from Bayelsa state to reach 
a peace deal with the militants has suffered serious commitment problems as one after the 
other armed group reneged on the ceasefire/no hostilities agreement. 
Table 5: Duration of Conflict 
1st Conflict No Yes Mixed 
2nd Conflict No Yes Shorter 
Current Yes Yes Longer 
Conflict 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
State weakness (in this case, the inability to monopolise force, enforce the law and/or 
resolve civil disputes non-violently) appears to have been a strong precursor to conflict in 
the Niger Delta over the last decade. 
On the other hand, grievance played less and less of a role in bringing about conflict, 
until it became undistinguishable. This trend supports Weinstein's (2005) argument of 
opportunism crowding out ideology as a motivation for civil conflict. Weinstein argues 
that in the event of conflict over abundant natural resources, opportunistic or greedy 
rebels crowd out ideological or grievance motivated rebels. This trend was most starkly 











co-opting the lye effectively transforming it from a social movement that drew on 
discourses of ethnic identities and solidarities with a wide public support, into a 
privati sed militia of the Rivers State administration. The conditions under which 
grievances over resource rent mismanagement and appropriation by looting elite are most 
potent, also present the perfect cover for opportunistic political entrepreneurs to 
appropriate a social movements' discourse, mobilising capacity and organisational 
strength, in order to acquire rents. Grievance is no longer the central issue in the Niger 
Delta; elite predation and state weakness are largely responsible for the onset and 
persistence of the current conflict. Interestingly, in the second outbreak of violence, 
political patronage helped shorten the conflict. Unfortunately, the infiltration of a 
legitimate, ideological struggle by political entrepreneurs provided the means to spark 












STATE RESPONSE TO NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
This chapter attempts to comprehensively examine the main responses of the Nigerian 
State to the crisis in the Niger Delta. To the observer, at least four strategies employed by 
the government in dealing with the crisis can be distinguished. First, the State has been 
willing to make a number of constitutional concessions in order to create new states and 
increase funding to the region; second, it has embarked on social development projects in 
the Delta; third, it has conceded to ransom demands made by armed groups in exchange 
for kidnapped oil workers; and finally, but not least significantly, the Nigerian State has 
used repressive security measures against protesters and militants in an effort to contain 
the crisis. 
Having established from previous chapters the spark and fuel of the conflict, a concise 
synthesis of the government's response is necessary to test that the prevailing policies fit 
the actual problems. 
The chapter thus discusses the four government strategies for addressing the crisis in the 
Niger Delta followed by some concluding remarks. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Under pressure from various ethnic minority groups, Nigeria has evolved from being 
divided into four regions in 1967 to 36 states by 1996 and from 301 in 1976 to 776 local 











from three since the early 1990s. Cross River, Rivers and Bendel states were split up to 
produce Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa and Delta states respectively bringing the number of states 
in the region to nine divided into 70 local government areas (LGAs) (Zalik, 2004: 421). 
State and LGA creation has allowed previously excluded ethnic groups in the region, 
such as the Ijaws, to participate more closely in the allocation of resources especially in 
the case of Bayelsa state which is largely an Ijaw state (Fynas, 2001: 33). Eberlain (2006: 
576-7) argues that in essence the creation of new states and LGAs is "a form of patronage 
via the expansion of administrative offices [and] represent[s] the most important ways of 
distributing and privati sing oil rents". These populist reforms have been an attempt by 
power holders to appease regional elites and control the disenfranchised thus diffusing 
mounting tensions (Zalik, 2004: 404-5). Some have argued that state and LGA creation 
should be embraced as a "highly positive [development] for minorities" (Osaghae, 1998: 
45) who now enjoy "a pedestal for direct access to and participation in the federation's 
politics and governance". Indeed until the 1990s the Niger Delta was continuously 
excluded from these federal arrangements. 
Although minorities have sought the creation of states as a means of re-directing 
resources towards them, the resulting struggles for power within the new administrations 
only exacerbate communal tensions through an additional level of minority-majority 
relations (Ake, 1997:306). The most prominent example of this phenomenon was when 
the creation of a new Warri South-West LGA sparked a major crisis between the Ijaw, 
Itsekiri and Uhrobo over the relocation of a local government headquarters by the state in 











neighbours between 1997 and 2003 over the relocation of a LGA headquarters from the 
Ijaw community of Ogbe-Ijoh to the Itsekiri community of Ogidi-Gben. 
The Nigerian federal government has also endeavoured to resolve the political crisis in 
the Niger Delta by increasing the portion of oil income that accrues to Niger Delta states. 
A Constitutional Conference convened during General Abacha's Government 
recommended a 13 per cent derivation fund to the Niger Delta states, but the change was 
not really implemented until General Abdulsalami Abubakar replaced him as head of 
state. However, at the inception of the first post-military democratic administration in 
1999, non-implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula was a source of much 
agitation, bringing the governors of the region into closer alliance with the belligerent 
'resource control' agitators and into dispute with national authorities (UNDP, 2006). 
Since the federal government's compliance with the derivation principle Niger Delta 
states have received record earnings into their coffers. For example, over the ten months 
from January to October 2005, the four leading oil producing states in the Niger Delta 
(Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and Akwa Thorn) received derivation funds amounting to $1.6 
billion (Eberlain, 2006: 585). 
However, the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula appears not to have 
assuaged feelings in the region much. At the National Political Reform Conference held 
in 2005 an upward review of the derivation quota to 17 per cent was proposed, but the 
Niger Delta delegates, who insisted on a minimum of 25 per cent with a phased review to 











collapse of the entire conference and further polarised national politics along oil-
prod ucing/non -oil-prod ucing lines. 
DEVELOPMENTAL CONCESSIONS 
Perceptions amongst the people of the Niger Delta of being marginalised have existed 
since the colonial era. In reaction to agitations from the region and under pressure from 
public opinion, a successive government formulated various policies and programmes to 
address developmental and political challenges they faced from the Niger Delta. The first 
concerted attempt to address these grievances was in 1957, when the colonial 
administration set up the Willink's Commission to investigate the fears of minorities and 
how to assuage them. The Commission concluded with the finding that "a feeling of 
neglect and a lack of understanding was widespread ... a case has been made out for 
special treatment of this area. This is a matter that requires special effort because (the 
area) is poor, backward and neglected." (UNDP, 2006: 13). Ironically, those statements 
are as true in the Niger Delta today as they were in 1957. In 1961 the immediate post-
independence government responded to the Willink's Report by setting up the Niger 
Delta Development Board (NDDB). One of the goals of the NDDB was to launch a 
number of sustainable agricultural projects for which Britain would provide technical 
assistance but British officials deemed the Board to be ineffective and largely a public 
relations exercise for the Nigerian government (Fynas, 2001: 36). Predictably, the NDDB 












Subsequent Niger Delta development plans and authorities included the Niger Delta 
Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) set up in 1976, and the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) set up in 1992. They too failed miserably. 
One of 11 river basin development authorities created during the civilian administration 
of Shehu Shagari, the NDBDA was plagued with organisational problems from inception 
and viewed largely as a means for politicians (none of the NDBDA board members came 
from the Niger Delta) to divert public funds to their personal use. 
In the wake of the annulled elections and the severe political upheaval which followed, 
the then military government established OMPADEC in July of 1992 to receive and 
administer, in accordance with the confirmed ratio of oil production in each state, the 
monthly allocation of the Federation Account. It was also at this time that allocations to 
Niger Delta states increased from 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent of oil revenue. In 1995 the 
derivation was raised to 6 per cent. More specifically, OMPADEC was charged with: 
a. Receiving and administering the monthly sums from the allocation of the 
federation account in accordance with confirmed oil-production ratio in each 
state-
1. to rehabilitate and develop oil-mineral-producing areas; 
11. to tackle ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration 
of oil minerals; 
b. Determining and identifying, through the commission and the oil-mineral-











development of projects agreed upon with local communities In the oil-
mineral-producing areas. 
Between 1993 and 1997, OMP ADEC received about N 17.42 billion, a little over US 
$135 million from the federal government, yet the Commission did not make any 
meaningful change to the wellbeing of the Niger Delta people or indeed their 
environment. The commission was noted for wastefulness and ridden with corruption. 
Two successive sole administrators of OMPADEC were dismissed for failure to account 
for huge sums of money. At the time of its closure, the Commission owed its contractors 
billions of naira and left the Niger Delta with several abandoned projects. Aside from a 
lack of regulatory mechanisms to monitor its finances and perfonnance (and consequent 
wastefulness and corruption), inadequate funding has often been cited as one of the 
obstacles that kept the Commission from achieving its goals. Another criticism levelled 
against the endeavour was its politicisation (Omotola, 2006b: 79-80). The Commission 
fell victim to political patronage and underwent frequent changes in management and 
structure during its lifespan. 
With rising demands from the regIOn and protests taking a violent tum, the first 
democratic administration constituted the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
in 2000, to take over from OMPADEC. President Obasanjo noted at the Commission's 
inauguration that the NDDC had the potential to offer a lasting solution to the socio-
economic difficulties and environmental degradation of the Niger Delta. The basic 
mandate of the NDDC was comprehensive, though essentially limited to addressing the 











states that "the commission shall formulate policies and guidelines for the development 
of Niger Delta and conceive, plan, and implement projects capable of fostering 
sustainable development of the area in line with set rules and regulations". In doing these 
things, it would have access to contributions of each of its member states, and it would 
submit to the direction, control, or supervision of the president in performing its functions 
(NODe Act 1999). According to its recently completed Master Plan, the seven main 
challenges to sustainable development and stability in the Niger Delta were noted as: 
• Poverty reduction 
• Security and public law and order 
• Diversification and growth of the regional economy 
• Improvements and maintenance of infrastructure 
• Human resources 
• Efficient and effective institutional structure 
• Good and transparent government 
Having identified good governance, transparency and security as either goals or 
challenges to its overall objective of peace and prosperity for all in the region, the Plan 
failed to provide any realistic strategies for achieving these imperatives. Strategies were 
scant and read more like goals than strategies. Nor does the Plan outline any coherent 
means of avoiding the accountability problems inherent in previous development plans. 
This view is supported by Omotola (2006b: 81) who argues that the scope of the Plan was 











While the Master Plan was being drawn up, the Commission engaged in what it terms 
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). These QIPs included the construction of roads, shoreline 
protection, rural and urban water supply schemes, skills training and the rehabilitation of 
schools and health centres. To combat the previous pitfall of inadequate funding, the 
NDDC act provided for several ostensibly feasible sources of funding, including statutory 
allocations from the federal purse (15 per cent of the total month I y statutory allocations 
due to Niger Delta member states), contributions from States and LGAs as well as 3 per 
cent of their total annual profit of all oil producing companies, including gas processing 
companies operating on and offshore in the Delta (NDDC Act 1999). By November 2002, 
the board had reported awarding contracts for more than 650 projects worth over N35 
billion or US $271.3 million across the nine member states of the region. The Federal 
Government accounted for 78 per cent of the N44 billion or US $341 million that was 
disbursed to the Commission between 2001 and 2004. Annual federation allocations to 
the NDDC between 2000 and 2004 respectively were approximately, N1 billion (US $7.3 
million), N10 billion (US $77.5 million), N14 billion (US $107.8 million), N9 billion (US 
$69.8 million) and N14 billion (US $108.5 million). As at 2006 member states had yet to 
contribute directly to the Commission, and there is continued strife over contributions 
from oil companies (UNDP, 2006: 13-15). In spite of the provisions of the NDDC Act on 
financing, the NDDC still faces some of the funding problems that plagued OMPADEC. 
Nonetheless, with independent and multilateral donor organisations eager to see an end to 
the destabilising socio-economic conditions prevalent in the Niger Delta, a lack of proper 
funding is hardly the most formidable obstacle to the success of the NDDC. Two 











private interest and not meaningfully fulfilling its mandate. The first, a concern 
resonating amongst critics of the programme (IRIN, 1999; Omeje, 2004; Zalik, 2004; 
Omotola, 2006b), is the Commission's top-down and non-participatory approach. The 
people of the Delta were not consulted while the initial bill was being drafted. Secondly, 
although the NDDC Act provides for legislative and executive oversight, these provisions 
merely formalise the previously applied principles for "monitoring" Niger Delta 
development plans. The Act failed to permit independent audits or mandate public 
disclosure of financial records. These shortcomings were brought to the fore when, Mr. 
Godwin Omene, one of the many managing directors to pass through the Commission 
since its inception, was dismissed for alleged corruption. The current managing director, 
Mr. Timi Alaibe, has twice run for governor of Bayelsa state, while the serving Chairman 
of the board, Mr. Sam Edem ran for governor of Akwa-Ibom state, both were 
unsuccessful and both allegedly used NDDC funds to drive their campaigns). Bedevilled 
by ethnic and patronage politics, the Commission has failed to meet the high expectations 
it raised of rapid socio-economic development and enhanced opportunities for individual 
wellbeing in the region. Coupled with the apparent increased wealth and extravagance of 
some government and NDDC officials in the region feelings of neglect and deprivation 
have persisted in the region, helping to legitimise the use of violence by non-state actors 
in the region. 
In the final analysis, the failure of the NDDC to correct the mistakes of past Niger Delta 
development initiatives has left many, not least of all the people of the Delta, with the 
lingering perception that as with previous Boards and Commissions, the Nigerian 











government is more concerned with appearing to address the myriad problems which 
plague the region than it is with actually addressing them. 
MONET ARY CONCESSIONS 
This approach has been more widely applied by MNOCs than government but recently in 
an effort to reassure the international community, some states in the Niger Delta have 
taken it upon themselves negotiate the safe release of kidnapped oil workers. In the past, 
MNOCs would negotiate compensation, contracts and job opportunities with elders or 
chiefs in the communities. To the exclusion of most of the community, the chiefs kept a 
disproportionate share of such benefits, appropriating most of the money for themselves 
and assigning contracts to their front companies. In the late 1990s, excluded youths began 
to tum the tide on the chiefs interjecting themselves into these transactions by harassing 
oil workers, taking hostages, occupying flow stations, etc. effectively forcing the oil 
companies to negotiate with them and make side payments. The side payments grew to 
such huge amounts that soon the youths split into factions to make counter demands. 
Rival gangs emerged, and soon second and third generations of youth gangs were 
extorting money from the oil companies. Following the Ogoni uprising and the wave of 
bad publicity they received on its account, MNOCs began paying off locals whenever a 
complaint arose to keep the news from spreading. Faced with massive unemployment the 
lure of easy money proved too strong to resist for many of the young men in the region 
(UNDP,2006: 114-5). 
Since the emergence of MEND, however, the rate of abductions has reached endemic 











taken hostage and released unharmed2 • Hostages are often only released on the payment 
of a hefty ransom. Some militants have been paid as much as Nl.5 million for the release 
of two to four oil workers (Omeje, 2006b: 482). Due to the large sums involved and the 
frequency of kidnappings, some state governments in the Delta have begun accepting 
some of the liability using money from undisclosed "security" budgets. But reports say 
that some government officials now see this as their opportunity to strike it rich. 
According to an account given by an oil company worker to Intellibriefs3 , in one instance, 
government officials who had been given the sum ofN20 million for ransom attempted to 
pass only N4 million on to the militants, claiming the balance had been stolen from their 
car. A heated argument ensued in front of the foreign hostage, and the officials were 
forced to give in. One Rivers-based militant admits that government officials typically 
withhold over half of the ransom 4 • The practice has spumed an entire industry with 
middle men negotiating ransoms for kidnapped oil workers. More recently, wealthy 
locals, relatives of politicians and even children have been abducted and held by so called 
militants (HRW, 2007: 83). Ultimately the more ransoms are paid, the greater the 
incentive for kidnappers and their associates; and the greater the reward, the more 
willingly risks are taken. 
REPRESSION AND MILITARY ENGAGEMENT 
As conflict between the MNOCs and Niger Delta communities escalated in the 1990s, a 
frequent response was to employ the services of State Security Forces to repress protest. 
2 This Day, 7 October 2007 
3 James Briggs, "Guide to the Armed Groups Operating In the Niger Delta" 













In the long run this approach has certainly created more aggravation than a lasting 
resolution. 
In the wake of the Kaiama Declaration, hundreds of non-violent protesters were killed, 
raped, beaten, arrested, intimidated and/or had their homes and communities burned 
down by Nigerian security forces. Authorities used regular units of army, navy and 
supernumerary police as well as creating special security units comprising military and 
police personnel. Recently a Joint Task Force (JTF) was created by the national 
government ostensibly to combat oil bunkering in the creeks and maintain the peace. 
Nevertheless, first hand reports abound of civilians being brutalised by operatives of the 
JTF (HRW, 2005). In intervening in inter-community conflicts, state security operatives 
are hardly ever impartial and tend to escalate the violence instead of acting as a peace-
keeping force (Ikelegbe, 2005; UNDP, 2006: 122-3). On occasions when youth militias 
and gangs have confronted state forces directly, such naked force is applied by the latter 
that numerous communities suspected of harbouring "wanted criminals" have been left 
devastated in terms of lives and properti (HRW, 1999 & 2005; Omeje, 2004; Okonta, 
2005; Watts 2007). Describing their activities as "sanitising troublesome locations"; 
"rooting out subversive elements" who disturb the 'peace'; or simply "maintaining law 
and order"; when in reality state security operations act more like death squads leaving 
grief and ruin in their wake (Okonta, 2005: 205-6). 
Alas, these heavy handed tactics have also been used to repress peaceful community 
protests against MNOCs revealing a kind of collusion between MNOCs and the State in 
5 This outcome is true of a number of communities in the Niger Delta including Odi, Odiama, Oleh, Bille, 











suppressmg legitimate community demands. There is evidence that MNOCs have 
supported the repression by providing boats, helicopters and funds for security personnel 
and possibly even arms (Frynas, 2001: 51). On occasion MNOCs, themselves, have 
sparked the violence by calling for state security when there has been no threat of 
violence from peaceful protesters (Frynas, 2001: 51-2; Ikelegbe, 2005; Okonta, 2005: 
205). The close ties of cooperation between MNOCs and the State in preserving their 
joint oil interests through security arrangements - otherwise known as the 'corporatisation 
of security' - has been subject of many commentators (Ibeanu, 2000; Frynas, 2001; Ukeje, 
2001; Omeje, 2004,2005 & 2006; Zalik, 2004). Aside from direct assistance received by 
state security forces, MNOCs maintain their own security outfits, often comprising state 
security personnel, to protect company property and staff. Policemen seconded to 
MNOCs to serve as supernumerary police guards number in their thousands (Frynas, 
200 I: 50). Further, in the context of increased security risks in the region, MNOCs also 
contract out security functions to private security firms. Ironically some of these are run 
by the very armed youths agitating against the MNOC activities (Omeje, 2006). 
Predictably, the money youth groups receive is used to buy more arms in order to secure 
more security jobs (Okonta, 2005: 206). 
The State's and MNOCs' over reliance on force has done more to hamper than help the 
overall security in the Niger Delta region. The accumulation of arms and occupation of 
police and military has produced a highly militarised zone which increases the tension 
and heightens the sense of insecurity in the region and indeed the country as a whole. In 
addition the disproportionate and often misplaced use of force in state security operations 











industry. Sadly, those most vulnerable to the severest impacts of oil exploration 
(environmental degradation and inadequate compensation for land appropriations) but 
without any means of coercing government or MNOCs to attend to genuine complaints 
are worst affected by the violence; denied, disenfranchised, displaced and all too often, 
dead. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has examined the Nigerian government's response to the Niger Delta crisis. 
While it does not argue that the persistence of the conflict is wholly as a result of its 
policies, the evidence presented suggests that the state response has in fact been a 
contributing factor to the crisis. 
As we found in the preceding chapter, the roots of the conflict can be found in the state's 
inability to manage civil disputes non-violently and maintain a monopoly on force as well 
as the clandestine activities of political elite. These factors combined with the incentives 
of oil bunkering and ransom payouts now enjoyed by local militia have also kept the 
conflict going and in some cases escalated it. Although the growing aspirations of the 
Niger Delta people and their unattended grievances once directly brought on 
confrontation with the state (as it still does in the case of oil companies) and continues to 
underlie the current state of affairs, it no longer presents an immediate cause of the 
conflict. 
Nonetheless, the post military government's most comprehensive policy response to the 











the main point. If anything, it constitutes an added source of rents to contest over and 
used to serve the parochial interests of local and national political elite. Most damaging of 
all the government's approaches, repression and military engagement is a stark reminder 
of the state's insensitivity to its citizens; failing to deliver development, it 
indiscriminately and forcefully suppresses perceived threats to its oil interests. In the case 
of direct monetary transfers to militants, what was ostensibly a short term security 
strategy has burgeoned into a multi million dollar industry involving the kidnappers, 
ransom negotiators (some of whom are employed by the MNOCs) and entire state 
administrations. The kidnap and ransom industry sustains the conflict by providing 
additional funds for arms as well as the rents it produces constituting an incentive for the 
continuation of hostilities. One intervention, constitutional concessions, which had the 
potential of addressing a fundamental weakness in the political arrangements of the state 
by giving previously excluded groups more access to resources, went terribly wrong once 
hijacked by ethnic bias. 
The four generIC strategies identified - constitutional conceSSIOns, developmental 
concessions, monetary concessions and military engagement, in their application have 
proven grossly inadequate to resolve the real issues ailing the Niger Delta. Any 
successful intervention in the Niger Delta must include institutional changes which limit 
the opportunities for government officials and politicians to divert state funds to their 
personal use, strengthens law enforcement and enhances the peaceful and lawful 












Over the last couple of decades, social scientists have sought new ways of understanding 
conflict. Since the end of the cold-war the concept of 'new wars' and 'complex 
humanitarian emergencies' have emerged. For the most part these conflicts have been 
self-financed, fought by enemies from within the same state and claimed massive 
numbers of civilian lives. An added characteristic of these conflicts caught the attention 
of neo-classical economists in particular, the role of natural resource rents as a source of 
belligerent finance. With the high humanitarian cost of these new 'resource wars', 
understanding the link between natural resources and conflict quickly became a major 
research agenda amongst other social science disciplines. 
The debate soon engendered what is now known as the 'resource curse' thesis; providing 
substantial evidence that natural resource abundance is linked to various negative 
development outcomes. However, the evidence is by no means conclusive and a number 
of criticisms have been raised against the resource curse theory. The first is that existing 
constructions of the resource curse do not satisfactorily account for the role of social 
forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development in 
resource abundant countries, or for the fact that, although many resource-rich countries 
have performed badly in developmental terms, some have done quite well. Secondly, 
scholars are accused of being too reductionist in their approaches to resource curse issues 
and the need to focus more on understanding differences in development outcomes 
between resource rich countries and the policy lessons that can be derived from such 











remains a useful analytical tool for understanding the pathologies associated with natural 
resources abundance. Beginning from its economic roots, the argument goes that 
abundant natural resources leads to dependence on an economic staple to the detriment of 
alternative sources of income; this mechanism was dubbed by Corden and Neary (1982) 
as the 'Dutch disease' and eventually results in poor growth and possibly even poverty. 
Political scientists in tum developed the theory of the 'rentier state' whose basic premise 
states that natural resources produce rents and the incentive to amass them, known as rent 
seeking; which results In corruption, state weakness, poor accountability, 
authoritarianism and ultimately conflict. 
Although the two theories, Dutch disease and rentier state, could co-exist quite 
comfortably side by side, the views of neo-classical economists and political scientists 
differed markedly when it came to the mechanisms by which resource related conflicts 
occurred. While the latter took a behaviouralist perspective arguing that grievances 
amongst citizens of rentier states, particularly those from resource rich regions were 
responsible for violent civil conflict; the former took the rational-actor view that a desire 
to benefit from resource rents enabled rebels to challenge the state. This greed versus 
grievance dichotomy dominated the debate for a long time and greatly influenced the 
actions of policy makers and donor organisations. The policy approach driven by these 
two essentially rebel-centric perspectives have been social development initiatives for the 
first and increased security measures for the second; both extremely useful interventions 
in this context but neither capturing the full gamut of issues influencing the onset and 











A third argument for the link between natural resource abundance and conflict can be 
found in the state-centric approach which highlights state or policy weakness and outright 
failure as a mediating factor. State-centric arguments reject the unidirectional view of the 
greed and grievance debates which insist that the existence of natural resource abundance 
and, or dependence is the root cause of all developmental pathologies that lead to violent 
confrontation within a state. Instead weak institutions that very often exist even before 
the discovery of significant natural resource reserves, create a permissive environment for 
conflict over rents. Nevertheless, the presence of resource rents tends to distort these 
conflicts after they commence. 
Nigeria presents an apt example of this mechanism and in the wake of the Iraqi war and 
the US government's declaration to assure African energy supplies as a matter of national 
security. It would appear there has been no better time for Nigeria to resolve its troubles 
in the Niger Delta. Like the colonial version before it, the Nigerian state under Nigerian 
rule has tried to maintain societal order by force while operating an essentially extractive 
economy in which little emphasis was placed on improving productivity or innovation. 
Since its discovery in commercial quantities, oil has been central to the political economy 
of Nigeria. When the existence of Nigeria as a single state was threatened by the civil war, 
the politically dominant northern elite and their allies in Nigeria's south-western region 
(and indeed in the world's West) put up formidable resistance to the Biafran state in 
which oil reserves were located and firmly ended the threat of secession. However, the 
war brought to the fore the fact that Nigeria's centre vis-a-vis its sub-regions was 
essentially weak and with this realisation, the gradual dissolution of federalism as a 











1960, the time of independence, have today become 36 ailing states almost all completely 
dependent on 'free' oil income from the federal government. The long stretch of military 
rule in Nigeria severely weakened the principle of derivation on with economic 
productivity relied replacing it essentially with a policy of rents distribution. Ironically, 
the ethnic minorities of the south-south region of Nigeria where the Niger Delta is located 
benefited very little from these arrangements even though they owned the land under 
which Nigeria's oil is sourced. Northern, south-western and to a lesser extent, south-
eastern elite have effectively held on to the reins of power and access to resource rents 
since Nigeria's inception leaving vast populations of the south-south in abject poverty. 
However, given the pervasiveness of poverty in Nigeria, it seems that such persistent 
inefficiencies in resource allocation have proven troubling not only for the significant 
welfare losses they entail, but more so for the danger of generating social conflict over 
time. (Ayogu, 2000: 29) 
In using the case to test the various resource-conflict mechanisms put forward in the 
resource curse literature, this thesis has not attempted to make any general claims. Instead 
in showing that neither greed nor grievance was a compelling factor in the onset of 
conflict in a post-military setting in Nigeria's Niger Delta, it has helped to disprove the 
validity of the greed versus grievance dichotomy. Nevertheless, it must be noted that in 
earlier incidences of violent opposition to the state from the Niger Delta, grievances were 
a defining motivation. The case showed very strong support for the grievance mechanism 
precipitating the second incidence of violence in the Niger Delta. Ijaw youth under the 
umbrella of the lye gathered to stage a non-violent protest on the streets of Yenagoa. 











greater control of petroleum resources after which many militant groups now model their 
demands, articulates long-held Ijaw concerns about the loss of control over their 
homeland and their own lives. In a letter to the MNOCs, the Ijaw youth called for oil 
companies to suspend operations and withdraw from Ijaw territory until a resolution 
could be reached on the way forward. A deadline of December 28 1998 was given after 
which Ijaw youth would engage in hostile disruption of oil production including shutting 
off crude oil valves across the Delta. When the government responded with devastating 
force, youth around the Niger Delta kept up a campaign of violent disruption against 
MNOCs with no obvious benefits to themselves'. 
On the other hand, greed, as captured by the looting mechanism did not bring about 
violence in the way the mechanism predicts. Instead of taking up arms as soon as they 
could afford it (having looted natural resources to raise funding), militants became 
involved in violent conflict only when their access to natural resource rents were 
threatened. Be that as it may, looting has played a very critical role since the onset of 
conflict. As predicted by the looting and incentive mechanisms under 'duration of 
conflict', resource rents generated within a context of armed conflict serve as a source of 
funding to maintain the violence as well as an incentive to prolong it. 
Overall we find that the greed and grievance hypotheses on which researchers have spent 
an overwhelming degree of time and resources do not solely explain the onset and 
persistence of violent civil conflict in this case. In particular, the initiation of violence in 
the Niger Delta, post-military rule, can be explained comprehensively by neither greed 
, Although MNOCs had begun the practice of paying 'security money' to community youths, the strategic 











nor gnevance. When exclusive focus is taken away from rebel-centric approaches, the 
state and indeed other civilian actors (not to mention other economic actors such as the 
MNOCs) were seen as partly causing the crisis revealing the complexity of the path to 
conflict in the Niger Delta. After decades of functioning merely as a petro-state, Nigerian 
institutions and bureaucracies have been severely weakened in part by their failure to 
develop and tax alternative, viable sources of income and in part through the predatory 
rent-seeking of its plundering elite. In the case of the Niger Delta, clandestine personal 
interventions into the oil markets by elite through oil bunkering led to the creation of 
shadow states that arm youth militia impressively enough to challenge state security 
forces. But in this struggle for resources and relevance, no one is left unscathed as the 
very political entrepreneurs who fund and orchestrate violence using young men under 
the guise of a mobilising discourse of social justice and resource control are themselves 
variously courted, contested and threatened by the youth they arm. Now militant leaders 
in the Niger Delta run their own bunkering operations, establishing independent sources 
of income with which to buy their own weapons and become a force to be reckoned with 
in their own right. This is possible to a large extent because in the remote creeks and 
swamps of the Niger Delta where plenty of oil can be found, government presence is very 
weak or not at all. Nevertheless, the weakness of the Nigerian state was most evident in 
its inability to resolve civil disputes between and within communities and between 
communities and the MNOCs without resorting to violence against its own citizens. For 
those in the Niger Delta who hoped democracy would bring an opportunity to express 
their will and improve their lot, the Nigerian state again proved incapable of overseeing 











country with few options other than violence to pursue their political and economIC 
aspirations. Thus state weakness provided not only motivations (a strong sense of 
discontent) but opportunities (reducing the costs of undertaking armed challenges) for 
employing violence against it. When considering the political economy of armed civil 
conflict in a context of socio-economic underdevelopment, weak institutions and elite 
rent-seeking the state as both institution and actor fuels the initiation and prolongation of 
armed conflict (Ballentine, 2003: 280). 
The construction of armed rebellion as a consequence of greed or grievance, prescribes 
military containment and developmental initiatives as the solutions to the crisis to the 
exclusion of measures that seek to improve governance as a means of addressing the 
conflict. In the Niger Delta, we see the government's over reliance on military 
intervention persist against considerable evidence of its failure. In applying and 
reapplying force as a main thrust against the crisis in the Delta, the state suffers further 
losses of legitimacy and risks perpetuating the violence it intends to stem. To reinforce 
this point I restate in full the poignant observations Okonta (2005: 207-8) makes the 
about Nigeria and which I quoted at the beginning of this thesis: 
Slowly, relentlessly, the sharp edge of the all important instrument of violence is 
being blunted. It may not be immediately apparent, but the Nigerian state is dying. 
A lion without his claws may as well be dead . 
... This predatory framework [rapine despotism}, since taken over by indigenous 
Nigerian elites, could not be permanently institutionalized. It has encountered 
sustained and determined resistance since the early years of the twentieth century 
from those to whom it has given only poverty and arbitrary rule. To maintain this 
illegitimate regime, constantly at risk of collapse, violence has to be applied and 
re-applied. 
But herein lies the paradox of violence as the structuring basis of a political order. 
The more violence is deployed to prop up and sustain unjust economic and social 











of social order within which the dominant elite can continue its business of 
seizing loot. People forcefully deprived of the right to represent their own 
interests in the crucial arenas of political and economic life are by definition 
discontented and impoverished subjects. 
The discontented represent a real threat to the existing order, and that order is 
also deprived of vital contributions to the project of creating prosperity for the 
commonweal[th). Scarcity is the soil in which revolt is nurtured. Political 
violence deployed to maintain control over the dollars generated by oil wealth 
may work in the short term, but ultimately it defeats its own purpose . ... And that 
is why the malformed political order is dying. 
Secondly, the government's Niger Delta development plan, embodied in the NDDC, 
without the necessary steps to ensure good corporate governance or good governance in 
the wider context of the state has failed to deliver on its intended aims and instead 
contributes to the crisis by providing its topmost management with funds to run 'do-or-
die' electoral campaigns in the region. 
Little elaboration is needed to recognise the undesirable consequences of direct monetary 
transfers to militants through the ill-advised short term strategy of succumbing to the 
ransom demands which has now become a multi-million dollar industry in the Niger 
Delta. As with the establishment of the NDDC, state and LGA creation may have turned 
out to be a positive development had it not become caught up in the pathologies of a 
weak state. Thus state weakness and elite predation not only enabled armed opposition to 
the state in the Niger Delta but the government's policy failures help to explain the 
protraction and escalation of the violence. 
In summary the greed, grievance conception of armed civil conflict offer corrupt state 
elite an excuse for avoiding the evidence of state and policy failure, the need for political 
and economic reform and the fact that predatory rent-seeking especially the form it 











state presents a problem it could also provide part of the solution by increasing its 
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